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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he year 2009 is decisive for the protracted Cyprus conflict. Incentives 
for a settlement might be higher and above all more evenly 
distributed among all parties than in 2004, when the Annan Plan 
failed due to an overwhelming Greek Cypriot rejection of the proposed 
blueprint despite Turkish Cypriot acceptance of the plan. Yet while 
strategic assessments and elite incentives bode cautiously well for a Cyprus 
settlement, ultimately an agreement will have to be approved by the two 
Cypriot communities in referendums and above all it will have to be 
implemented by the Cypriots on the ground. In other words, ordinary 
Cypriots lie at the crux of the conflict settlement as well as the drawn-out 
conflict resolution process, determining the ultimate success or failure of 
any blueprint signed by their leaders. 
In view of the centrality of the people in this peace process, the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in collaboration with Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot partners, launched a project in late 2007 to 
investigate, through successive opinion polls, what Cypriots think of each 
other, of the peace process and of possible solutions to the conflict. The 
project has developed in two distinct stages. The first stage and poll was 
conducted simultaneously in the northern and southern parts of the island 
in March-April 2008 and its results were published in the first book in this 
series: Erol Kaymak, Alexandros Lordos and Nathalie Tocci, Building 
Confidence in Peace – Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process, CEPS, 
October 2008. On the basis of the first survey and book, the authors 
proceeded to the second stage of the project, zooming in on the details of a 
final settlement. The second survey was also conducted simultaneously in 
the southern and northern parts of the island, this time in January and early 
February 2009 and its results are presented here. The questions put in the 
first questionnaire were deliberately broad and general. In this second 
survey, the authors unpacked the different components and options of the 
T 
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thorniest dossiers on the conflict settlement agenda. The question 
underpinning this second survey and book is the extent to which Cypriots 
converge more once we leave the abstract level of labels and slogans and 
enter into the specifics of a package deal. It is often claimed that ‘the devil 
is in the detail’. Does this apply to Cyprus, or is a different and thus far 
more promising tendency at work on the island?  
The survey results show that by delving into the details of a Cyprus 
settlement, agreement is possible but it will be a hard sell to the people of 
both communities. What matters above all and more than the positions 
adopted by the leaders, political parties or external actors in and 
surrounding the Cyprus conflict is the substance of the proposed deal itself, 
with core issues of concern being, above all: security, property, governance, 
rights and freedoms, territory and ‘settlers’. 
Security 
Any agreement on security that could garner the support of both 
communities would have to reconcile Greek Cypriot opposition regarding 
Turkish military intervention and Turkish Cypriot desires that Turkey 
remain a credible guarantor. Given bizonality and other facts related to any 
‘new state of affairs’ the extant Treaty of Guarantee would require 
amendment, as was the case when the Annan Plan blueprint called for 
additional protocols. Amending the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, however, 
runs a risk of not overcoming Greek Cypriots’ negative perceptions 
regarding the specific document, as evidenced in the current poll; with this 
in mind, an amended or new treaty could be designed in such a way as to 
also be acceptable to Turkish Cypriots, thus serving as the basis of a new 
security regime in Cyprus. 
While negotiating and designing the future security and treaty 
architecture of a unified Cyprus is a delicate matter, which will require the 
creativity and high level commitment of all relevant parties both in Cyprus 
and internationally, public opinion on the ground does seem to suggest 
specific elements that could be considered further by the formal 
negotiators.  For one, the treaty – whatever it is called - could ‘unpack’ the 
security and implementation challenges that a unified Cyprus may face in 
the future, differentiating between potential military threats, governance 
crises and instances of non-implementation of the agreement; defining for 
each a differentiated response mechanism that could, as needed in each 
case, involve the federal and constituent state governments in Cyprus, the 
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governments of Greece and Turkey, the EU and the UN. Authorisation for 
action in cases of non-implementation remains problematic, since there is 
divergence both on the issue of unilateral intervention rights as well as on 
whether the UN could also serve as enforcer in the case of non-
implementation. In this regard further research is called for, exploring 
alternative consensus models and suggesting ways in which future 
disagreements between the treaty signatories could be resolved.    
Whatever the particular variation, the key point is that a new security 
regime serves as a potential point of convergence that could be potentially 
promoted by political leaders as a viable alternative to the status quo. This 
could also be combined with the creation of a bicommunal force, which 
together with Greek and Turkish troops would participate in UN 
peacekeeping and possibly ESDP missions abroad, as well as a renewed 
mandate for UNFICYP to monitor the implementation of the agreement on 
the ground.  
Property 
Bicommunal consensus could also be reached on the property dossier with 
the breakdown of properties into different categories. The order of priority 
deciding whether a property would be returned (as preferred by the Greek 
Cypriots) or compensated for (as preferred by the Turkish Cypriots) would 
vary between categories of property. Specifically, the poll results suggest 
that original owners could have priority in a subset of cases concerning 
unused properties and properties used by ‘settlers’ or other non-Cypriots, 
while current users could have priority in the cases of properties on which 
public utilities have been built, or that are being used for income 
generation, or that have been significantly improved and built upon. The 
most complex case to resolve is that of properties that are now being used 
by displaced persons from the other community as primary residences. For 
these types of properties, it is envisioned that a specific set of criteria be 
used to decide on who would have priority, though a give-and-take 
solution can also be envisioned whereby priority for properties used by 
displaced persons remains with current users, while priority for religious 
heritage sites, similarly controversial, is granted to original owners. More 
broadly, where properties are compensated for rather than returned, a mix 
of different compensation schemes could be foreseen, including 
compensation in cash, and compensation with other properties of 
equivalent value, ideally avoiding the option of government bonds, for 
which the Greek Cypriots have little enthusiasm.  
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Governance 
On the issue of governance it was also possible to register possible 
convergence around the setting-up of a rotating presidency/vice 
presidency (according to set time periods) elected on separate tickets with 
an element of cross-voting. Under such a model the presidential team 
would nominate a council of ministers responsible for those ministries 
under federal or mixed competences. The question of representation ratios 
within federal offices would remain and require compromise, possibly by 
opting for a mix of 75-25, 60-40 and 50-50 depending on the specific staffing 
requirements and other ministry or federal office sensitivities, thus de-
politicising and de-polarising the issue of ratios. In the case of the council of 
ministers, ratios could include a 2:1 configuration in terms of the communal 
origin of participants, which is considered ‘reasonable and fair’ by Greek 
Cypriots, but a 50-50 ratio in terms of the right of each of the two leaders to 
nominate members to the council of ministers from both communities, 
which is considered ‘reasonable and fair’ by Turkish Cypriots. A 
complementary approach to resolving the issue of ratios involves 
establishing a trade-off between competences and ratios: the stronger the 
federal government would be in relation to the constituent states, the more 
equality in representation would be envisioned; and vice-versa.  
Rights and Freedoms 
Compromise is also possible on the question of rights and freedoms, with 
Turkish Cypriots willing to extend a general set of rights and freedoms to 
all citizens throughout the island with the qualified extension of voting, 
property and business establishment rights. This finding reflects how the 
Turkish Cypriot attachment to bizonality is anchored above all in the fear 
of being dominated both politically and economically by the Greek 
Cypriots, while at the same time they maintain openness towards the 
principle of coexistence of the two communities and the creation of a 
multicultural society. 
Territory and ‘Settlers’ 
Major divergences lie instead in the territory and ‘settlers’ dossiers, which 
may call for ‘give and take’ between these two dossiers. Territorial 
readjustments will inevitably be a major area of Turkish Cypriot 
concession, but the blow may be softened by including federal areas (of 
which some would be in what is now Greek Cypriot territory) in the new 
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map of Cyprus. As far as immigrants from Turkey are concerned, 
differences may well have to be split down the middle, while at the same 
time Greek Cypriot anxieties over immigration and the potential for racism 
and xenophobia would need to be tackled urgently through a ‘multi-
cultural education drive’.  
Selling a Cyprus settlement to both communities on the island in 
separate referendums will no doubt be a tough challenge. Yet what this 
project, with its two surveys and books, has attempted to demonstrate is 
that a people’s peace in Cyprus is possible. Particularly when delving into 
the details of a future plan, including the thorniest issues of the Cyprus 
settlement, the authors found that not only is a compromise feasible, but 
above all, by probing what citizens think, fear and desire, that new and 
creative ideas may be put to the service of the overall peace process on the 
island.  

| 1 
1. Introduction 
Incentives for a settlement in 2009 may be higher and above all more 
evenly distributed among all parties than in 2004, when the Annan Plan 
failed. The current Greek Cypriot leadership seems conscious of the fact 
that time is not on its side. Back in 2004 the expectation, fed by the former 
leadership, was that through the leverage gained from EU membership, the 
Republic of Cyprus would be able to extract new and significant 
concessions from the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. True, Cyprus’ EU 
membership has been consistently used and abused as a source of pressure 
on Turkey; but in many ways developments on the ground have 
consolidated the partition on the island. The international reputation of the 
Turkish Cypriots has changed and improved. While this change in 
international perceptions has not brought with it the longed-for lifting of 
the international isolation of northern Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots and 
Turkey are no longer viewed as the indisputable bête noire of the Cyprus 
quagmire.1 Despite its failure, the momentum generated and the 
expectations raised by the Annan Plan and EU accession created new 
dynamics in the property realm and consequently triggered an economic 
boom in the north, which, while unsustainable,2 has visibly changed the 
economic outlook of Turkish Cypriots. Adding to the pressure, despite the 
vocal Greek Cypriot resistance to a timetable, political realities related both 
to the internal dynamics of the Turkish Cypriot community and to Turkey’s 
EU accession process seem to suggest that the end of 2009 might be a ‘de 
facto deadline’ for the peace process. 
Turning north, Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, elected 
president in February 2005, had ridden on the pro-solution wave that 
                                                     
1 Throughout the 1990s and until the 2003 change of Turkish Cypriot leadership, the 
Turkish side was widely considered by the international community as resisting the 
prospect of a federal settlement in Cyprus, promoting instead a confederal solution or 
alternatively the international recognition of the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state in the 
northern part of Cyprus.  
2 In fact, the widely publicised ‘Orams Case’ and other such lawsuits that Greek 
Cypriots are filing, have increased the risks inherent in purchasing properties from 
Turkish Cypriots in the north that were originally owned by displaced Greek Cypriots. 
As a result, by 2008 demand for properties in the north had dampened, a situation now 
further exacerbated by the global credit crisis and concomitant recession.  
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swept across the north in the final years of the Annan Plan process in 2003-
4. Talat faces elections in early 2010 and so far has little to show to his pro-
solution constituency. Moreover, despite the re-launch of the peace process 
in September 2008, the mood in the north has palpably changed and 
hardened, as evidenced by the strong showing of the Nationalist Union 
Party (UBP) in polls in the run up to the April 2009 parliamentary 
elections.3 Indeed, the polls conducted for the purposes of this book are in 
congruence with this trend, demonstrating a shift towards the UBP, with 
significant numbers of former CTP voters declaring their intent not to cast a 
vote or to repatriate to the UBP. Hence the urgency of a solution among the 
Turkish Cypriots, acutely felt by their leader, Mr. Talat, who has already 
indicated that he may not stand for re-election if there is no solution by the 
end of 2009, explaining that ‘[i]f there is no hope for a resolution by [year-
end], I will have completed my mission.’4  
Stakes are high for Turkey as well. Over the last four years, Cyprus 
has poisoned EU-Turkey relations, partly due to the direct actions of 
member state Cyprus and largely because other member states have 
supported or hidden behind the Cyprus issue to block or slow-down 
Turkey’s accession course. In the autumn of 2009, the European Council is 
scheduled to review Turkey’s accession process in relation to Turkey’s 
(non)implementation of the Additional Protocol extending the EU-Turkey 
customs union to Cyprus. In addition, Turkey’s accession negotiations, 
which are currently proceeding at snail’s pace, risk grinding to a halt by the 
end of the year in view of the chapters directly or indirectly blocked by the 
Cyprus conflict. Enthusiasm for EU membership amongst Turkish 
stakeholders and the public alike has waned, but it is unlikely that any 
mainstream actor in Turkey, regardless of how nationalist or eurosceptic, 
desires the process to be completely derailed.5 Equally concerned about a 
                                                     
3 A poll conducted by KADEM released in March 2009 revealed that the main 
opposition party, the National Unity Party (UBP), enjoys a clear lead over the 
incumbent Republican Turkish Party (CTP), http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/ 
index.php/cat/2/news/67507/PageName/Ic-Haberler.  
4 J. Christou (2009), “Talat to Stand Down if No Solution Found”, Cyprus Mail, 8 March 
2009. 
5 A. Toksabay Esen & H. Tolga Bölükbaşı (2008) ‘Attitudes of Key Stakeholders in 
Turkey towards EU-Turkey Relations: Consensual Discord or Contentious Accord?’, in 
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drastic derailment in EU-Turkey relations is Greece, where government 
and opposition alike have reoriented their foreign policy vision basing it on 
Turkey’s EU accession and its parallel domestic transformation.  
Strategic assessments and elite incentive structures thus bode 
cautiously well for a Cyprus settlement. But ultimately an agreement, if 
reached, will have to be approved by the two Cypriot communities in 
referendums and above all it will have to be implemented by Cypriots on 
the ground in the years to come. In other words, ordinary Cypriots lie at 
the crux of the conflict settlement as well as the drawn-out conflict 
resolution and transformation process, determining the ultimate success or 
failure of any blueprint signed by their leaders. 
The project to investigate what Cypriots think of each other, of the 
peace process and of possible solutions to the conflict has developed in two 
distinct stages. The first stage and poll was conducted simultaneously in 
the northern and southern parts of the island in March-April 2008, the 
objective of which was to explore and suggest ways in which the 
leaderships in Cyprus and the EU could raise public confidence in and 
offer incentives for peace on the island. One of the principal findings of this 
study was that Cypriots share a high degree of mistrust towards each other 
and towards the peace process. In view of this, we highlighted mutually 
acceptable confidence building steps that could be pursued alongside 
negotiations on a comprehensive settlement in order to maximize the peace 
process’ chances of success.  
On the basis of our first survey and book, we proceeded to the second 
stage of our project, zooming in on the details of a final settlement. Our 
second survey was conducted simultaneously in the southern and northern 
parts of the island in January and early February 2009 and its results are 
presented here.6 In this second survey we have set aside those issues that 
                                                                                                                                       
N. Tocci (ed.) Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy, 
IAI Quaderni: Rome.  
6 Two identical polls were conducted, in the north and south, by Prologue Consulting 
Ltd. and CYMAR, respectively.  For each poll, 1000 interviews were conducted. 
Respondents were selected initially through stratification of urban and rural 
populations based on census data. Details of the sampling process can be found in 
Annex 1. The questionnaire was produced by CEPS in collaboration with a research 
team comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and was fine-tuned through 
the input of a selected group of official and non-official Greek Cypriot, Turkish 
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emerged as relatively uncontroversial from our first survey, namely the 
economic and international outlook in Cyprus. On these issues our first 
survey found that both communities agree on bridging the economic 
divide between the two communities through a carefully planned 
development strategy foreseeing gradual economic integration and joint 
ventures, as well as temporary restrictions to economic freedoms, the 
protection of vulnerable groups and a significant input by the international 
community. Regarding Cyprus’ foreign policy outlook both communities 
concurred that Cyprus, alongside Greece and Turkey and within an EU 
context, would actively seek to project peace, stability and prosperity to its 
wider neighbourhood, would enjoy sovereign equality vis-à-vis Greece and 
Turkey, and would actively support Turkey’s EU membership bid.  
On other issues, however, results were not so promising. We detected 
significant distance and polarisation on the questions of governance, 
property, rights and freedoms, security and ‘settlers’ in particular. The 
questions we put in our first questionnaire were deliberately broad and 
general. In this second survey we unpacked and specified in greater detail 
the different components and options regarding the principal and thorniest 
dossiers on the conflict settlement agenda. The underlying question or 
hypothesis underpinning this second survey and book is the extent to 
which Cypriots converge more once we enter into the specifics of a package 
deal. The aim of this second survey and book is therefore to explore not just 
whether Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots want a settlement on the 
island, but above all what kind of solution they desire and would accept. 
What is the peace that Cypriots want and thus the peace that leaders might 
expect the wider public to ratify and subsequently live with, cherish and 
nurture in the years and decades to come?   
2. Hopes, Expectations and Priorities in the Peace Process 
We began our investigation by enquiring whether Cypriots expect and 
want a settlement on the island. Beginning with expectations, both Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, reconfirming the results from our first 
survey, are pessimistic about the current negotiations, with majorities on 
both sides (56% of the Greek Cypriots and 61% of the Turkish Cypriots) 
                                                                                                                                       
Cypriot, Turkish, Greek and international interlocutors. The questionnaire is 
reproduced here in Annex 2. 
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giving a poor prognosis on the issue of whether the peace process will 
deliver an agreement (see Figure 1). It should be noted however that the 
response of the public to this question is not necessarily a fair indicator of 
whether there is public interest in or commitment to achieving a settlement. 
The responses to such questions, asked frequently by pollsters, often make 
it to the headlines of daily newspapers with the subtext “gloom and doom 
in Cyprus”. In view of this situation, we decided to ask not just whether 
people are hopeful that the process will produce results, but whether they 
wish the process to produce results. Very encouragingly, both communities 
unambiguously want the process to succeed, with 64% of the Greek 
Cypriots and 65% of the Turkish Cypriots desiring a mutually acceptable 
settlement to emerge from the peace process (see Figure 2). This is often 
overlooked in surveys and the media, which only ask and report about 
levels of expectation and therefore reach the false conclusion that the public 
has given up on and/or does not care about the peace process.  
Figure 1. To what extent are you hopeful that the peace process will produce 
results?  
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14%
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Figure 2. To what extent do you wish – and expect from the leaders – that they 
reach a mutually acceptable settlement through the peace process? 
25% 24%
11% 11%
64% 65%
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20%
30%
40%
50%
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70%
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settlement
 
 
The desire for success of the peace process links back to the results of 
our first survey regarding the level of (dis)satisfaction with the status quo. 
In that poll we found that 84% of Turkish Cypriots and 75% of Greek 
Cypriots were either dissatisfied or had mixed feelings about the status 
quo. In this survey this perceived dissatisfaction, albeit with an interesting 
role reversal between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, was 
reconfirmed: 67% of the Turkish Cypriots and 90% of the Greek Cypriots 
either reject or find the status quo merely tolerable (see Figures 4a and 5a). 
While to different and changing degrees, both communities in Cyprus thus 
share a sense of scepticism about the peace process as well as a resolute 
desire for these negotiations to succeed, not least in view of their 
dissatisfaction with the current situation on the island.  
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Figure 4a. Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, and 
considering each of the alternative settlement models presented here, 
how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of 
these models? (Greek Cypriot self-perceptions) 
82% 9% 8%
78% 14% 9%
60% 30% 10%
20% 37% 44%
9% 11% 80%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Two separate and internationally recognised states
A confederation of two sovereign states
Continuation of the current situation
A bizonal bicommunal federation
One unitary state and central government for the
whole of Cyprus
I would definitely reject this I would tolerate this as a compromise option I would find this satisfactory
 
 
Figure 5a. Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, and 
considering each of the alternative settlement models presented here, 
how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of 
these models? (Turkish Cypriot self-perceptions) 
48% 19% 33%
41% 26% 33%
41% 20% 39%
28% 24% 49%
14% 15% 71%
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Two separate and internationally recognised states
I would definitely reject this I would tolerate this as a compromise option I would find this satisfactory
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Figure 4b. How acceptable or unacceptable do you think each of these models is for 
the majority of the other community? (Turkish Cypriot perceptions of 
Greek Cypriot community) 
73% 13% 15%
64% 22% 14%
63% 23% 14%
41% 23% 36%
32% 26% 42%
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Majority of the other community would tolerate this as a compromise option
Majority of the other community would find this satisfactory  
 
Figure 5b. How acceptable or unacceptable do you think each of these models is for 
the majority of the other community? (Greek Cypriot perceptions of 
Turkish Cypriot community) 
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Delving deeper into this question, we enquired into the reasons why 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots want a solution. What are their 
priorities and motives for wanting the peace process to succeed? As far as 
the Greek Cypriots are concerned, the results are clear-cut and 
unequivocal. Greek Cypriots care above all about security, with the desire 
to end the perceived threat emanating from Turkey ranking as the number 
one motive for solving the conflict (81%), followed by “achieving a just 
resolution of the property issue” (63%), “living within a functional, 
democratic and internationally respected state” (63%), “being able to live 
and work anywhere in Cyprus” (54%) and finally the issue of territory 
(50%). Greek Cypriots are significantly less concerned with issues such as 
power-sharing or with benefits they already enjoy (e.g., EU membership). 
This can be interpreted as an intense focus on and concern for what Greek 
Cypriots view as the ‘core issues’ of a settlement – security, property, 
functionality, human rights, territory – which drown out most other 
responses given when participants had to choose their five preferred 
options. Turkish Cypriots, by contrast, do not display similar peaks and 
troughs in motivations and priorities, with reasons to reach a settlement 
being spread more evenly across different options. This said, we find that 
improving the economic situation scores highest (70%), preserving cultural 
identity (54%), the independence, functionality and democratic nature of 
governance (53%), and securing basic freedoms and EU membership (48% 
each). Mutatis mutandis, a more evenly spread Turkish Cypriot 
prioritisation of motives for change is reminiscent of the results of our first 
survey, which found that Turkish Cypriots are more ‘transformationist’ 
than Greek Cypriots, in so far as they desire change in a diverse set of 
features within their society.7  
Summing up, security and property can be seen as ‘common core 
issues’, that are of strong concern to both communities, whereas territory is 
                                                     
7 “As a visible effect of different contextual circumstances, Turkish Cypriots appear to 
be more transformationist, i.e., willing to change a diverse set of features within their 
society, valuing almost equally order (59%), democracy (51%), fighting inflation (41%) 
and freedom of speech (45%). By contrast, Greek Cypriots appear to care more for 
current problem areas within their society such as maintaining order (71%), fighting 
crime (62%) and fighting inflation (59%), as opposed to areas they feel relatively 
content with (e.g., democracy 33% and freedom of speech 34%)”. See Kaymak, Lordos 
& Tocci (2008), Building Confidence in Peace: Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process, 
CEPS, Brussels, pp. 18-19.  
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of more concern to the Greek Cypriots and the economy is of more concern 
to the Turkish Cypriots. An implication here is that in areas of clear 
divergence where win-win agreements are difficult to reach, package 
compromises could be made based on the issues of prime interest to the 
two communities. A worrying finding however is that both communities 
rate “returning to a constitutional order where the two communities share 
power” as bottom on their list of priorities (10% of the Greek Cypriots and 
24% of the Turkish Cypriots). On the one hand this is natural, given that 
power-sharing is a necessary outcome of a compromise rather than a 
motive for a settlement per se. Furthermore, the specific wording 
“returning to a constitutional order” may have been interpreted as a return 
to the 1960 set-up, on which neither side is particularly keen. On the other 
hand, it is a cause for concern if the two communities do not put their 
hearts into the power-sharing process and focus instead on what they each 
separately have to gain from an agreement (see Figure 3). 
While not viewing power-sharing as a prime motive for a solution, a 
power-sharing agreement based on a bizonal and bicommunal federation 
(BBF) was however reconfirmed in this second survey as the only possible 
compromise solution. As in our first poll, we found huge divergence on the 
options of a unitary state (with 80% of Greek Cypriots in favour but 67% of 
Turkish Cypriots either rejecting or viewing this as merely tolerable), two 
separate states (with 71% of Turkish Cypriots in favour but 91% of Greek 
Cypriots rejecting or viewing this as merely tolerable) and a confederation 
(with 39% of Turkish Cypriots in favour but 92% of Greek Cypriots 
rejecting or finding this as merely tolerable). 
Additionally, there is divergence in each community’s perceptions of 
the other community’s preferences: Turkish Cypriots mistakenly believe 
that Greek Cypriots prefer the persistence of the status quo (when asked 
“how acceptable or unacceptable do you believe the Greek Cypriots would 
consider each type of solution”, Turkish Cypriots respond that the first 
option for Greek Cypriots is the continuation of the status quo, the second 
option is a unitary state while federation is merely their third option – 
whereas in fact Greek Cypriots report that their first option is a unitary 
state, their second and also acceptable option is a federation, while 
continuation of the status quo ranks a distant third). Greek Cypriots 
mistakenly think that Turkish Cypriot are open to consider a unitary state 
(Turkish Cypriots rank a unitary state as their worst option, even below 
continuation of the status quo, whereas Greek Cypriots think that it ranks 
second after a two state solution and preferable to a federal solution). 
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Figure 3. Of these possible motives for solving the Cyprus Problem, which five are most important to you? 
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These misperceptions are symptomatic of the poor communication 
and low levels of understanding and trust between the two communities. 
Turkish Cypriots believe Greek Cypriots prefer the status quo to a 
federation due to the 2004 rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek 
Cypriots: if the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, the reasoning goes, 
and given that the Annan Plan was an adequate federal blueprint, then the 
Greek Cypriots reject a federal settlement. Although the Greek Cypriots 
have been protesting since 2004 that their rejection of the Annan Plan was 
related to specific aspects of the plan and not to its federal nature, these 
explanations have fallen on deaf ears among the Turkish Cypriots, where 
the belief persists that what Greek Cypriots reject is the concept of a bizonal 
bicommunal federation. The Greek Cypriot misrepresentation of Turkish 
Cypriot priorities is quite different in its origin but also very revealing: the 
notion that Turkish Cypriots would accept a unitary state is related to a 
narrative whereby ‘it is Ankara that demands a bizonal settlement because 
this would further its strategic interests, whereas the Turkish Cypriots in 
reality would prefer a unitary state just like the Greek Cypriots’. Thus, 
based on this narrative, the Turkish Cypriot desire to enjoy substantial 
autonomy and self-rule in the context of a bizonal bicommunal federation 
is overlooked by the Greek Cypriot community, in a manner that Turkish 
Cypriots tend to find condescending and bothersome. 
Moving beyond these misunderstandings, the one and only real 
option of convergence is that of a bizonal and bicommunal federation with 
81% of Greek Cypriots and 74% of Turkish Cypriots finding a BBF satisfac-
tory or tolerable – despite perceptions to the contrary! (See Figures 4 and 5). 
These results are consistent with those from our first survey, where the 
reworded option “bizonal bicommunal federation with political equality” 
gained the support of 75% of Greek Cypriots and 90% of Turkish Cypriots.8  
3. Towards a Future Referendum 
Having ascertained the motives and scope for a compromise agreement, we 
turn to the key question of a future vote in a referendum. Here the results 
are alarming: a referendum on both sides will be a tough sell, with 34% of 
                                                     
8 The addition of the term “with political equality” explains the relatively higher level 
of support of the Turkish Cypriots and the relatively lower level of support of the 
Greek Cypriots to this option in the first survey. However, under both specifications of 
a BBF, significant majorities within the two communities are in favour.    
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Greek Cypriots and 37% of Turkish Cypriots definitely or leaning towards 
a “no”; a mere 23% of Greek Cypriots and 41% of Turkish Cypriots 
definitely or leaning towards a “yes”, and with the Greek Cypriots in 
particular displaying high levels of undecided voters (44%) (see Figures 6 
and 7). In both communities undecided swing voters will determine the 
referendum results, and, as opposed to 2004, we are unlikely to witness an 
overwhelming wave of Turkish Cypriot support for a future plan, as 
evidenced by numerous polls. In our first survey the Annan Plan proved 
not only unpopular among Greek Cypriots (who had rejected it in 2004), 
but was almost equally among Turkish Cypriots.9 Corroborating this data, 
a recent poll by KADEM asked Turkish Cypriot respondents how they 
would vote for the Annan Plan if the 2004 referendum were repeated in 
2009. Almost 54% declared that they would vote “no”.10 While it is not the 
Annan Plan that will be put to a referendum at the end of the current peace 
process, but rather a new plan based on the current negotiations between 
Mr Christofias and Mr Talat, the fact that the Annan Plan gets such a poor 
showing in polls attests to the fact that the mood among Turkish Cypriots 
has shifted in a negative direction, a fact that will, mutatis mutandis, make 
any future referendum campaign more challenging than the equivalent 
2004 campaign.   
                                                     
9 Kaymak, Lordos & Tocci (2008),  op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
10 See the 5 March 2009 edition of Kibris newspaper, http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/ 
index.php/cat/2/news/67584/PageName/Ic-Haberler. The significant divergence 
between our poll’s findings and the KADEM poll might be related to the methodology 
underlying the wording of the question in each case. First, it should be noted that in 
our case we did not ask about “how they would vote if the Annan Plan was put to 
referendum” but rather “how they would vote if the negotiations conclude and a new 
plan is drafted”. Thus, part of the divergence can be explained as representing the hope 
that citizens are investing in the current process ‘for a settlement plan that is an 
improvement on the Annan Plan’. Additionally, for the purposes of our poll, a primary 
interest was to identify swing voters for the sake of further analysis and thus a specific 
response category “I am just as likely to vote Yes as to vote No” was presented to 
participants. In polls that do not present such a clearly defined intermediate category, 
such as the KADEM poll, but instead offer only a “Yes” or “No” response and record 
separately the refusal to respond, it is typical to find higher values in the “Yes” and 
“No” categories and much lower values in the “Undecided” category. While this may 
be a better way to identify hidden trends in the public mood, we felt that in our case, 
and given that a referendum is still a long way away, it was more important to ensure 
that swing voters were identified correctly, whatever their current mood. 
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Figure 6. Considering a hypothetical scenario where the negotiations between the 
two leaders conclude, a solution plan is drafted and a referendum is 
organised, how do you see yourself voting in such a future referendum? 
(Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 7. Considering a hypothetical scenario where the negotiations between the 
two leaders conclude, a solution plan is drafted and a referendum is 
organised, how do you see yourself voting in such a future referendum? 
(Turkish Cypriots) 
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Returning to our findings in relation to the intended referendum 
vote, a demographic analysis of the responses allows various important 
conclusions to be drawn (see Figures 8a and 8b). First, in relation to age 
group, we note similarities but also differences between the two 
communities; in the Greek Cypriot community, older voters in the 55-64 
and 65+ categories tend towards a ‘Yes’ vote, younger voters in the 18-24, 
25-34 and 35-44 categories tend towards a ‘No’ vote while voters in the 45-
54 categories are equally split. It should be noted of course that across all 
age groups the swing voter category remains the largest segment (see 
Figure 8a). Among the Turkish Cypriots, an intriguing situation seems to 
have developed whereby the middle-aged groups – 35-44 and 45-54, 
strongly tend towards a ‘Yes’, yet both the younger (18-24, 25-34) and older 
(55-64, 65+) groups tend more in favour of a ‘No’. In other words, the 
generation of Turkish Cypriots that is currently in a position of authority 
and driving the Turkish Cypriot pro-solution policy is ‘under siege’ both 
from their children’s and their parents’ generations, who express strong 
scepticism and reservations over the pro-settlement policy that has been 
pursued over the last few years. 
Figure 8a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against age group 
(Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 8b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against age group 
(Turkish Cypriots) 
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In relation to political party affiliation, we note another interesting 
differentiation between the two communities. Greek Cypriots adhering to 
the three largest parties – DISY, AKEL and DIKO – all seem to display 
similar profiles when it comes to their intended vote in a future 
referendum, with – in each party – about 20-25% trending ‘Yes’, 20-25% 
trending ‘No’ and 50% being swing voters. While there is a slightly larger 
proportion of ‘Yes’ voters in DISY and a slightly larger proportion of ‘No’ 
voters in DIKO, the overall similarity is noteworthy, especially considering 
the differences in expressed policy positions in relation to the Cyprus 
conflict by the senior leaderships of these three parties. In contrast, among 
supporters of smaller parties such as EDEK, and among those who declare 
that they will put in an abstention vote, there is a very strong trend in 
favour of a ‘No’ vote with comparatively few swing voters.11 What we see 
in effect is the political marginalisation of the ‘hard No’ vote, to the extent 
that these voters feel that they have no choice but to abstain from 
mainstream politics given that the major parties no longer represent them. 
                                                     
11 In our poll, the same trend seems to apply to other small parties, such as EVROKO 
and the Green Party, but due to the small number of respondents hailing from those 
parties it is not possible to draw statistically valid inferences. 
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What is developing into the dominant political viewpoint instead is a ‘wait 
and see’ approach: “Let’s see the results of the peace negotiations and then 
we will decide how to vote” (see Figure 9a). Among Turkish Cypriots, the 
situation is quite different since party affiliation and intended referendum 
vote correlate very closely: those who still support CTP are largely 
committed to voting ‘Yes’, those who support UBP are largely committed 
to voting ‘No’, though it is noteworthy that even among UBP supporters 
there is a 25% segment tending towards a ‘Yes’, while supporters of the 
smaller parties display intermediate positions (see Figure 9b). 
 
Figure 9a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against political party 
affiliation (Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 9b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against political party 
affiliation (Turkish Cypriots) 
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When relating intended referendum vote to district of residence, we 
see substantial differentiation in both communities. Among Greek 
Cypriots, Limassol and Paphos strongly tend towards a ‘No’, though the 
swing voter element remains strong; Nicosia, in contrast, is split three-way 
between the ‘Yes’ trend, the ‘No’ trend, and the swing voters. Interestingly, 
in both the Larnaca and Famagusta/Ammohostos districts swing vote 
seems to dominate by 80% and over. Residents of these districts appear to 
be waiting to hear ‘recommendations from the Capital’ before making up 
their minds (see Figure 10a). Among Turkish Cypriots we see that 
Nicosia/Lefkoşa slightly trends ‘Yes’, Kyrenia/Girne and 
Morphou/Güzelyurt slightly trend ‘No’, while Famagusta/Gazi Mağusa is 
equally split and highly polarised, and finally İskele (the Karpas peninsula) 
strongly trends ‘Yes’ – a counterintuitive finding given the high number of 
settlers from Turkey who are resident in that area (see Figure 10b).   
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Figure 10a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against district of 
residence (Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 10b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against district of 
residence (Turkish Cypriots) 
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However when comparing intended referendum votes to levels of 
education and levels of income, a more sobering picture emerges. The ‘Yes’ 
trend seems to be driven, in both communities, by the higher socio-
economic groups. In terms of education, by those holding post-graduate 
degrees, and in terms of income, by those families who earn more than 
€2,500 in the Greek Cypriot community or YTL 3,400 in the Turkish Cypriot 
community. An additional finding that deserves to be highlighted is that in 
both communities the least educated socio-economic group (up to 
elementary school only) displays a ‘Yes’ trend of a similar magnitude to 
that displayed by the most educated group (post-graduate degree) and in 
marked contrast to all the intermediate socio-economic groups that trend 
towards ‘No’ (see Figures 11a, 11b, 12a, 12b). These findings taken together 
are troubling, insofar as they signify a resistance to the peace process on the 
part of the ‘middle’ classes in between,12 which if left unaddressed may 
lead to a gradual rift between the political elites and the wider population 
on matters related to the Cyprus conflict. In such a scenario it will be very 
difficult for the political leadership to successfully guide the population in 
a referendum. To avert such an outcome, it is important that the 
leaderships are seen to make an effort to engage with the public in matters 
relating to the Cyprus conflict, listening to the concerns of citizens and 
taking care to ensure that the peace process is, to the extent feasible, 
inclusive of grassroots views. 
                                                     
12 The fact that the least educated seem to be immune to this negativity seems to 
suggest that resistance to the peace process is culturally mediated, and specifically that 
both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots develop more negative attitudes as they 
come into contact with the mainstream media, the secondary schooling system etc. 
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Figure 11a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against level of education 
(Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 11b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against level of education 
(Turkish Cypriots) 
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Figure 12a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against level of income 
(Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 12b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against level of income 
(Turkish Cypriots) 
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Beyond this basic demographic analysis, an additional set of 
questions arises, regarding the relation of intended referendum vote with 
the underlying desire for a settlement; with levels of support or opposition 
to the status quo; and with the actual vote in the 2004 referendum. 
Additionally, one might ask to what extent the referendum results will be 
determined by political party affiliation, and more precisely which 
segments of the population will be amenable to such political influence. To 
shed some light on these questions we have conducted a ‘Decision Tree’ 
analysis, which is a statistical method designed to reveal the underlying 
decision process that affects respondents when they declare that they are 
tending towards a ‘Yes’ or towards a ‘No’, or are swing voters.13  
The first important finding that emerges from this Decision Tree 
analysis is that, in both communities, the vote in the 2004 referendum 
served as a ‘formative experience’ and acts as the first point of reference 
from which voters will make their future decision. From this point 
onwards, we see differentiation between the two communities. Among the 
Greek Cypriots, those who voted ‘Yes’ in the 2004 referendum now tend to 
branch-off into two distinct groups: those who have in the meantime 
accepted the status quo, thus exhibiting a tendency to be swing voters this 
time round, and those who fervently reject the status quo, who can be 
expected to vote a ‘strong Yes’ this time as well. Among Greek Cypriots 
who had voted ‘No’ in 2004, the situation is somewhat more complex. 
Those who declare a low desire for a settlement will give the matter no 
further thought and vote ‘No’ again. Those who voted ‘No’ in 2004, but 
declare a basic desire for a settlement but with ambivalent or even positive 
feelings about the status quo will turn to their political party for guidance. 
This specific voter group, comprised of former ‘No voters’ who are now 
torn between their desire for a settlement and their ‘comfort’ with the 
current situation, can be expected to listen very carefully to their party’s 
line, alongside their own evaluation of the proposed plan and its 
consequences in their daily lives (see Figure 13a). 
                                                     
13 The Greek Cypriot Decision Tree was grown in accordance with the QUEST method. 
The model correctly classified 51.1% of all cases (null model = 20% correct 
classification). The Turkish Cypriot Decision Tree was grown in accordance with the 
CRT method and pruned to avoid overfitting to a maximum difference in risk of 1 
standard error. The model correctly classified 50.8% of all cases (null model = 20% 
correct classification) 
24 | LORDOS, KAYMAK & TOCCI 
 
Figure 13a. ‘Decision Tree’ analysis of the decision process underlying the 
intended referendum vote (Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 13b. ‘Decision Tree’ analysis of the decision process underlying the 
intended referendum vote (Turkish Cypriots) 
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In contrast with the Greek Cypriots, in the Turkish Cypriot 
community, dilemmas characterise former ‘Yes’ voters instead. In fact most 
Turkish Cypriot former ‘No’ voters can be expected to vote ‘No’ again, 
while former ‘Yes’ voters can be expected to divide between those who still 
strongly desire a settlement and are expected to vote ‘Yes’ again, and those 
who are ambivalent or no longer desire a settlement. This final group, of 
former ‘Yes’ voters who have lost faith in a settlement, can also be expected 
to turn to the political leadership for guidance (see Figure 13b). Thus, in 
both communities there seems to be an inverse relationship between 
internal conviction and willingness to receive guidance from political 
authorities, a factor that will undoubtedly affect the outcome of any future 
referendum.  
It should be noted however that the above mentioned groups, of 
internally inconsistent Greek Cypriot ‘No’ voters and internally 
inconsistent Turkish Cypriot ‘Yes’ voters who are open to receiving 
guidance in either direction, are not large enough segments of society to 
swing, by themselves, the referendum results.14 Most Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots do in fact have strong and clear-cut views on issues 
relating to the Cyprus conflict and can thus be expected to trust their own 
judgement in any proposed settlement. 
Given the importance of swing voters, we enquired directly into the 
determining factors that would lead undecided respondents to tilt one way 
or another. The results are clear-cut and verify the above analysis: as far as 
the mainstream of swing voters goes, they will above all look into the 
substance of the plan, rather than be influenced by the positions of 
particular actors, be this their family, their friends, their political party, 
their president or their ‘motherland’. The only partial exception to this 
conclusion is the relative weight attached by Turkish Cypriot swing voters 
to Turkey’s position (28%). In the actual practice of evaluating a proposed 
settlement plan, this could mean a higher attributed value to security issues 
for the Turkish Cypriots, security being amongst Turkey’s principal 
concerns in a Cyprus settlement. Linked to Turkey’s role and position, it is 
also notable that the Greek Cypriot swing vote is highly sensitive to the 
perceptions of Turkey’s post-settlement intentions, that is, ‘whether Turkey 
                                                     
14 The precise segment of the electorate that can be classified as ‘swing voters amenable 
to social and political influence’ is approximately 10% of the population in each 
community, as will be seen in the cluster analysis below. 
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will have convinced me that it intends to honour the agreement’ (45%). 
Thus, taken together, these two findings highlight the critical role that 
Turkey will play in securing a Cyprus settlement. Beyond Turkey’s 
position towards a future settlement, for undecided voters on both sides 
the issues that rank highest as determining factors in a future vote are, for 
Greek Cypriot swing voters, the security and guarantees provisions in the 
plan, which influence 85% of swing voters, territory (60%), citizenship 
(57%), property (53%) and governance (39%); valued most by Turkish 
Cypriot swing voters are security and guarantees (66%), property (49%), 
power-sharing (44%), the economy (39%) and the legal status of 
sovereignty (34%) (Figure 14). 
An additional cluster analysis of swing voter priorities reveals that 
Greek Cypriot swing voters fall into three major categories: those who are 
concerned exclusively or almost exclusively with security issues (40% of 
swing voters, 24% of total population): those who will evaluate the future 
plan in all its major dossiers (42% of swing voters, 22% of total population); 
and those who are amenable to social influence from the leader of their 
community, their political party or their close social and family circle (18% 
of swing voters, 10% of total population) (see Figure 15). In contrast, 
Turkish Cypriots fall into four major categories: those who will evaluate the 
plan in a balanced manner (50% of swing voters, 21% of total population), 
those who are amenable to social and political influence (23% of swing 
voters, 9% of total population), those who will look almost exclusively into 
the citizenship provisions of the plan (13% of swing voters, 5% of the total 
population), but additionally those who are driven by trust-related issues 
and will make their decision on the basis of whether they perceive the 
Greek Cypriots to be a credible, trustworthy and safe partner (14% of swing 
voters, 6% of total population) (see Figure 16).  
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Figure 14. Of these possible factors, which five do you think will most influence your decision to vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ at a 
future referendum? (question addressed only to 'swing voters' as identified in the question regarding intended 
vote in a future referendum)  
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Figure 15. Cluster analysis of voter profiles in a future referendum 
(Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 16. Cluster analysis of voter profiles in a future referendum 
(Turkish Cypriots) 
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The results for swing voter preferences analysed alongside the results 
regarding the priorities of the two communities as a whole (see Figure 3 
above) lead us to conclude that security is the number one concern for both 
communities, while property and governance are also important concerns 
for both communities, each of these dossiers influencing more than 35% of 
swing voters within each community; territory is of prime concern to the 
Greek Cypriots, while the economy is of prime concern to the Turkish 
Cypriots. Citizenship is a prime concern of Greek Cypriots as a whole, and 
yet it is the sole issue on which a substantial minority group within the 
Turkish Cypriot community will vote. It is to the vexatious issues within 
these dossiers that we now turn.   
4. Security: Guarantees, Rights of Intervention and 
Peacekeeping  
Our poll data revealed security to be a prime issue of concern for both 
communities. To date, beyond general statements made by the two 
leaderships, with the Greek Cypriot side insisting on the abolition of the 
Treaty of Guarantee and the Turkish Cypriots adamant on its continuation, 
the security dossier has not been tackled in direct negotiations. Yet turning 
to the people and delving into the details of the security provisions of a 
future agreement, we found scope for convergence, particularly on less 
conventional options lying beyond the traditional positions to which the 
leaderships have been anchored over the decades.  
Beginning with the thorniest issue – guarantees – we predictably 
found divergence on the question of whether there should be a 
continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee as it currently stands, which Greek 
Cypriots deem to be entirely unacceptable (69%). About half of Greek 
Cypriots (48%) also strongly reject the continuation even of an amended 
version of the existing Treaty of Guarantee, a finding that highlights the 
challenges of attempting to solve the security dossier on the basis of the 
Treaties that accompanied the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 
(Figure 17a). While the Turkish Cypriots are predictably more positive over 
the prospect of a continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, it is interesting to 
note that their support for such a scheme is far from enthusiastic, with only 
47% of Turkish Cypriots finding the continuation of the Treaty of 
Guarantee satisfactory or essential, 27% finding it merely tolerable and 26% 
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finding it unacceptable.15 For Greek Cypriots, the ideal solution would 
simply be to avoid any kind of treaty between Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, 
and just allow international law and the UN Charter to govern relations 
between them (62% satisfactory to essential). This however is the worst 
option for Turkish Cypriots, with 57% finding it unacceptable or merely 
tolerable, but interestingly, again, 43% finding it satisfactory. In addition, 
the specific option of not having any treaty whatsoever would also have to 
be evaluated in the light of Turkey’s security role on the island and the 
value attributed by Turkish Cypriots to Turkey’s position on a future plan 
(see Figure 14), as well as the importance of the guarantee issue for the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership.16 In view of these realities, any proposal to 
entirely do away with any kind of Treaty super-structure would swiftly 
lead to the conversion of this Turkish Cypriot public ambivalence over the 
‘no Treaty’ proposal into a strong rejection. 
Of course, any settlement in Cyprus would require, at minimum, the 
adaptation of the existing Treaty of Guarantee to the ‘new state of affairs’ 
that would include, among other features, bizonality. The 2004 UN 
blueprint included additional protocols to amend the treaty so that it 
would carry over mutatis mutandis. However, the proposal that the Treaty 
of Guarantee should be maintained but amended is not especially popular 
either (see Figures 17a and 17b). In particular, amending the 1960 Treaty of 
Guarantee runs a risk of not overcoming Greek Cypriots’ negative 
perceptions regarding the specific document, as evidenced in the current 
poll, so this is a public presentation challenge that the negotiators ought to 
keep in mind. 
                                                     
15 One could argue that the Turkish Cypriots are a divided society, with a fundamental 
polarising issue being the relation of the Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. Seen from this 
point of view, those who answered to the above question that they support the 
continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee – about half – may be seen as the segment of 
the population wishing to see Turkey remain on the island and are aligned to Ankara 
without hesitation; those who ‘merely tolerate’ the Treaty of Guarantee – about one 
quarter – as well as those who reject it, may represent an ambiguity regarding the role 
of Turkey in Cyprus as well as on sources of security.   
16 The Turkish Cypriot leadership has repeatedly affirmed the need for a continuation 
of effective guarantees that would not simply remain ‘on paper’. See ‘Foreign Minister 
Avci criticizes Christofias’, 13 October 2008, TRNC Foreign Ministry website.  
32 | LORDOS, KAYMAK & TOCCI 
 
Figure 17a. One important issue in these current negotiations, regarding the security and guarantees dossier, is the manner 
in which unified Cyprus, Greece and Turkey will co-operate to ensure that the implementation of a settlement 
will happen smoothly as agreed in advance. In this matter, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each 
of the following overall frameworks? (Greek Cypriots) 
69% 21% 5%2 3
48% 27% 14% 7% 4%
29% 25% 24% 14% 8%
19% 19% 19% 22% 21%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 ‐ between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
and the United Kingdom ‐ will continue to apply without any
changes, as part of the Comprehensive Settlement agreement.
The Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 ‐ between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
and the United Kingdom ‐ will continue to apply but certain
amendments will be made to it in response to specific concerns
expressed by one or the other community.
A new Treaty will be signed between unified Cyprus, Turkey and
Greece, that will clarify each side’s responsibility regarding the
implementation of the agreement, in a spirit of equality between
the signatory states.
There will be no Treaty specifically governing the relations between
unified Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. Instead, the three states will be
expected to act in compliance with international law as set out in the
UN Charter and other international agreements.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
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Figure 17b. One important issue in these current negotiations, regarding the security and guarantees dossier, is the manner 
in which unified Cyprus, Greece and Turkey will co-operate to ensure that the implementation of a settlement 
will happen smoothly as agreed in advance. In this matter, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each 
of the following overall frameworks? (Turkish Cypriots) 
29% 28% 19% 12% 12%
25% 33% 22% 12% 9%
26% 27% 24% 8% 15%
19% 26% 25% 13% 17%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
There will be no Treaty specifically governing the relations between
unified Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. Instead, the three states will be
expected to act in compliance with international law as set out in the
UN Charter and other international agreements.
The Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 ‐ between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
and the United Kingdom ‐ will continue to apply but certain
amendments will be made to it in response to specific concerns
expressed by one or the other community.
The Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 ‐ between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
and the United Kingdom ‐ will continue to apply without any
changes, as part of the Comprehensive Settlement agreement.
A new Treaty will be signed between unified Cyprus, Turkey and
Greece, that will clarify each side’s responsibility regarding the
implementation of the agreement, in a spirit of equality between
the signatory states.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
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Another possibility that may win the support or at least the tolerance 
of significant majorities in both communities, would be a new treaty signed 
by a post-settlement Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, in a spirit of equality 
between the signatory states that would clarify all the signatories’ 
responsibilities regarding the implementation of an agreement. Depending 
on its design, this may or may not be significantly different from an 
amended Treaty of Guarantee. Particular provisions will be elaborated on 
below. The primary advantage of this option is that it is more likely to 
motivate Greek Cypriots to ratify a settlement in a referendum while not 
necessarily being ruled out by the Turkish Cypriot voters. 
This proposal actually ranks first for Turkish Cypriots (55% 
satisfactory, 26% tolerable, 19% unacceptable), marginally over the 
proposal for a continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee that was discussed 
above. Of course the level of acceptability of such a proposal would 
ultimately depend on the specific terms of a new treaty and whether it 
indeed responds credibly and effectively to Turkish Cypriot security needs. 
The reasons for the relative popularity of this proposal among Turkish 
Cypriots would require subsequent investigation but may be related to, on 
the one hand the emphasis on the implementation of the settlement, an 
issue over which the Turkish Cypriots are very sensitive, and on the other 
hand to the emphasis on the equality between the signatory states. For the 
Greek Cypriots, this proposal ranks second after the ‘no Treaty’ proposal 
(46% satisfactory to essential, 25% tolerable, 29% unacceptable), but it is 
still acceptable enough to form a framework for the resolution of the 
security aspect of the Cyprus conflict. Again, as in the case of the Turkish 
Cypriots, the ultimate acceptability of such a proposal would depend on 
the specific terms of the treaty and the extent to which it responds to their 
security concerns. 
In this context, and irrespective of the label and symbolism with 
which the treaty superstructure is imbued, what specific treaty provisions 
would be effective in convincing both communities that their security 
needs have been met? The first and primary question regards rights of 
intervention and in particular under which conditions and through which 
procedures external actors would be called upon to intervene.  
Unsurprisingly, Greek Cypriots reject unilateral rights of intervention 
without prior consensus between the signatories (76% viewing this as 
entirely unacceptable), and about half of Turkish Cypriots reject both the 
exclusion of military means of intervention as well as abolishing rights of 
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intervention altogether (47% viewing both options as entirely unacceptable) 
(see Figures 18a and 18b). By contrast, we found a measure of convergence 
between the communities on several options.  
One option for a new or revised treaty is to introduce the EU or UN 
as guarantors of implementation of any agreement. This is generally 
popular with Greek Cypriots who strongly favour this (see Figure 19a). To 
lesser degrees, Greek Cypriots are also open to consensual mechanisms that 
are designed to resolve implementation-related challenges, subsequently 
leading to a UN role in mediating outcomes.   
Turkish Cypriots are also cautiously open to this consensual option, 
though we note significant resistance to giving the UN Security Council a 
role in implementation under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (see Figure 19b). 
These findings taken together suggest that a further exploration of 
consensual models, which capitalise on the initial willingness of the two 
communities to work for consensus on implementation-related challenges, 
might be worth pursuing in research and in the negotiations. The key 
challenge in this respect would be to devise a mechanism whereby 
decisions on action in cases of an implementation–related crisis would be 
made with the consensus of unified Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, while also 
considering channels, viewed as credible by all sides, to effectively resolve 
deadlocks in cases where consensus between the parties proves elusive. 
While some type of ‘consensus model’ is met with initial interest by 
the Turkish Cypriots, of all the offered options, Turkish Cypriots are most 
at ease with the clarification of a set of guidelines that establishes 
appropriate responses and responsibilities to implementation problems 
that may arise. In this spirit, intervention by Greece and Turkey, as well as 
by the UN and the EU (the latter intervening exclusively within the realm 
of its competences through the suspension of EU benefits and voting rights) 
could be mandated in relation to specific non-implementation scenarios, 
assigning to each scenario the appropriate response and responsibility by 
each actor (see Figures 19a and 19b). 
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Figure 18a. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mentioned sides on the 
implementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion 
of each of the following elements? (Greek Cypriots - responses to 'intervention rights' related questions) 
76% 10%5%3 6
27% 17% 20% 14% 21%
11% 6% 13% 19% 51%
4 4 10% 26% 57%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
It should be re‐affirmed that the ‘right of intervention’ of Greece
or Turkey can still be exercised unilaterally by one or the other, in
case agreement between them proves impossible.
It should be made clear that before any military intervention can
take place by Greece or Turkey, permission will need to be
granted by the UN Security Council.
It should be made clear that the ‘right of intervention’ by Greece
or Turkey excludes the possibility of military intervention.
‘Rights of intervention’ by Greece or Turkey should be abolished
altogether on the basis that unified Cyprus is going to be a
sovereign country that is capable of taking care of its own affairs.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
 
A PEOPLE’S PEACE IN CYPRUS | 37 
 
Figure 18b. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mentioned sides on the 
implementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion 
of each of the following elements? (Turkish Cypriots - responses to 'intervention rights' related questions) 
47% 16% 17% 11% 8%
47% 17% 14% 10% 13%
34% 18% 21% 13% 14%
30% 25% 22% 10% 13%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
‘Rights of intervention’ by Greece or Turkey should be abolished
altogether on the basis that unified Cyprus is going to be a
sovereign country that is capable of taking care of its own affairs.
It should be made clear that the ‘right of intervention’ by Greece
or Turkey excludes the possibility of military intervention.
It should be made clear that before any military intervention can
take place by Greece or Turkey, permission will need to be
granted by the UN Security Council.
It should be re‐affirmed that the ‘right of intervention’ of Greece
or Turkey can still be exercised unilaterally by one or the other, in
case agreement between them proves impossible.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
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Figure 19a. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mentioned sides on the 
implementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion 
of each of the following elements? (Greek Cypriots - responses to implementation guarantees related questions) 
17% 22% 24% 19% 19%
12% 22% 27% 21% 18%
10% 18% 23% 21% 29%
5%10% 25% 26% 35%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
A consensual mechanism should be devised so that Turkey, Greece
and unified Cyprus can resolve all implementation‐related challenges
that may arise; and in case consensus proves impossible then the UN
will decide on what course of action must be taken.
A set of guidelines should be agreed in advance by all the sides,
clarifying the appropriate response and responsibility for each
implementation‐related challenge that may in the future arise.
Whatever treaty is agreed should be ratified by a UN Security Council
Resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which means that in
case of non‐implementation the UN would have the right to forcefully
intervene to restore the agreed state of affairs.
The EU should set – for all the sides ‐ motives for implementation and
penalties for non‐implementation, related to EU benefits and
participation in EU decision making.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
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Figure 19b. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mentioned sides on the 
implementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion 
of each of the following elements? (Turkish Cypriots - responses to implementation guarantees related questions) 
36% 23% 20% 9% 12%
28% 19% 27% 11% 15%
25% 27% 25% 11% 12%
12% 21% 24% 17% 27%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Whatever treaty is agreed should be ratified by a UN Security Council
Resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which means that in
case of non‐implementation the UN would have the right to forcefully
intervene to restore the agreed state of affairs.
The EU should set – for all the sides ‐ motives for implementation and
penalties for non‐implementation, related to EU benefits and
participation in EU decision making.
A consensual mechanism should be devised so that Turkey, Greece
and unified Cyprus can resolve all implementation‐related challenges
that may arise; and in case consensus proves impossible then the UN
will decide on what course of action must be taken.
A set of guidelines should be agreed in advance by all the sides,
clarifying the appropriate response and responsibility for each
implementation‐related challenge that may in the future arise.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
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The issue thus becomes: what kind of non-implementation challenge, 
i.e., what kind of threat scenario, would warrant what kind of response and 
by whom? When asked about likely threat scenarios, both communities 
remain anchored in memories and fears of the past: Greek Cypriots are 
most concerned about issues relating to Turkey’s compliance, above all the 
withdrawal of troops (77%), the agreed repatriation of ‘settlers’ (77%) and 
the abuse of guarantor rights (68%), as well as internal Cypriot issues such 
as Turkish Cypriot return of agreed properties (71%) and problems and 
deadlocks in governance (58%). Turkish Cypriots are concerned about 
Greek Cypriot usurpation of their collective rights, fearing most the 
deadlocks in governance (78%) that might lead to Greek Cypriots evicting 
or rendering politically ineffective Turkish Cypriots at the federal level 
(58%) (Figure 20). 
As far as appropriate responses to these threat scenarios by external 
guarantors are concerned, Greek Cypriots reject any kind of military 
intervention by Greece and Turkey, preferring instead a mix of EU 
sanctions and UN peacekeeping for the different non-implementation 
challenges. Turkish Cypriots instead prefer military intervention by 
guarantor actors in cases of attempted military control over all of Cyprus 
(interestingly both by Greece/Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriot 
constituent state and vice versa) and attempted secession. The most likely 
reading of the latter result is that military intervention may have been 
interpreted as Turkey acting in support of the Turkish Cypriot side 
attempting secession because they find themselves under attack or 
oppression by Greek Cypriots or Greece. Note further that among Turkish 
Cypriots the lowest response to support for military intervention is 17%, 
which can be interpreted as the baseline resistance to any kind of 
abrogation of Turkey’s intervention rights among a segment of Turkish 
Cypriot society. Another interesting finding, pointing to a certain mirror 
situation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, is that whereas 
Greek Cypriots have a distinctly higher threat perception when it comes to 
issues pertaining to Turkey’s compliance, they tend to reject Greek military 
responses to these, thus showing that they either reject the principle of 
military intervention per se, or alternatively that they reject Greece as a 
credible provider of military security against Turkey. By contrast whereas 
Turkish Cypriots are far more willing to accept Turkish military responses 
under particular scenarios, for those threat scenarios they are most 
concerned about – Greek Cypriot usurpation of their collective rights – they 
would prefer to see either EU sanctions or a mix of Turkish intervention, 
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EU sanctions and UN peacekeeping. Turkish Cypriot preferences for 
Greek/Turkish military intervention are most prominent in those issues 
that are explicitly military in nature – such as an armed incursion by one 
community/motherland against the other, while for governance-related 
threats responses tend toward favouring the ‘chastising’ role that the EU 
could have on a political or economic level. Regarding one of their most 
crucial concerns – being evicted by the Greek Cypriots at the federal level – 
Turkish Cypriots are divided in that they put varying emphasis on 
different responses by the EU, the UN and the motherlands in protecting 
the Turkish Cypriots and restoring order (see Figures 21a and 21b). 
A final security aspect relates to future peacekeeping arrangements. 
Here we find the scope for convergence to be narrow, but possible. Greek 
Cypriots reject a continuation of the 1960 Treaty of Alliance both under the 
scenario that it would apply until both communities agree it is no longer 
required (61% unacceptable) and under the scenario whereby it would 
apply until Turkey enters the EU (65% unacceptable); the persistence of the 
British sovereign bases (74% unacceptable), a Turkish military base in 
return for the cancellation of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance (90% 
unacceptable), the stationing of several thousand Greek and Turkish 
soldiers (87% unacceptable), and the stationing of a NATO force alongside 
Cyprus’ NATO membership (56% unacceptable). Turkish Cypriots concur 
– for different reasons – in rejecting a continuation of the Treaty of Alliance 
(59% unacceptable), including up until Turkey’s EU membership (55% 
unacceptable), a finding that is counter-intuitive and deserves to be 
commented upon. What might be happening here is that Turkish Cypriots 
reject both the small size of the proposed forces (less than 1,000 troops from 
each ‘motherland’) and the notion that the contingents would not be 
equally sized (950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers). Furthermore, strong 
minorities of Turkish Cypriots also reject an international force authorised 
by a UN Chapter 7 mandate (44% unacceptable), as well as a European 
security force including soldiers from Greece and Turkey stationed in 
Cyprus (44% unacceptable). In contrast, Turkish Cypriots would support 
the presence of several thousand Turkish and Greek soldiers so long as 
they are in equal numbers (61% satisfactory) or even the stationing of a 
Turkish military base in the north in return for the cancellation of the 1960 
Treaties (56% satisfactory). Both these options, as discussed above, are 
strongly unacceptable to Greek Cypriots, however. 
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Figure 20. The possibility of challenges and difficulties after a solution is agreed is often discussed and considered within 
each community. Regarding this matter, which of these post-solution scenarios do you consider most likely to 
materialise in the future? (up to five responses) 
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Figure 21a. For each of these threat scenarios, what type of external intervention aimed at restoring order would you be 
willing to consider? (Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 21b. For each of the following threat scenarios, what type of external intervention aimed at restoring order would you 
be willing to consider? (Turkish Cypriots) 
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Initial convergence seems instead to be possible on the creation of a 
unified bicommunal force (68% of the Turkish Cypriots and 82% of the 
Greek Cypriots), confirming the results of our first survey, which found 
that 72% of the Greek Cypriots and 67% of the Turkish Cypriots favoured 
the creation of such a force. Both communities also concur that such a force 
could participate in UN missions abroad (68% of the Turkish Cypriots and 
78% of the Greek Cypriots) and ESDP missions together with Greece and 
Turkey (75% of the Turkish Cypriots and 63% of the Greek Cypriots).17 
Important issues to research further in future public opinion polls but also 
to clarify on an expert level in relation to the creation of such a unified 
bicommunal security force include, the precise mandate of such a force, the 
chain of command leading up to the federal level, whether non-Cypriots 
would be included in the force and at which levels, etc. In addition to a 
bicommunal force, both sides also would find satisfactory or at the very 
least tolerate a new UNFICYP mandate to oversee the implementation of 
the agreement (72% of the Turkish Cypriots and 90% of the Greek Cypriots) 
(see Figures 22a, 22b, 23a, 23b).   
                                                     
17 It should be noted in this regard that in the 1960 Agreements a provision was 
included for the establishment of a Cyprus army, which however was never 
implemented due to disagreements over specific issues that had to do with the 
disbanding of the militias and the establishment of the new army. If a proposal to 
create a unified bicommunal security force is now taken up in the context of a new 
federal Cyprus, the relevant events of the 1960s should be read as a case study of 
pitfalls to avoid when attempting to proceed to a new security order. Along with the 
issue of the disbanding and/or withdrawal of existing troops, the creation of any new 
security force would definitely have to be supervised very closely through whatever 
implementation mechanism is established.  
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Figure 22a. On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a Comprehensive Settlement, how much 
would you be willing or unwilling to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (Greek Cypriots - responses 
for Cypriot, Turkish and Greek troops) 
90% 5% 311
87% 7% 3 22
65% 18% 9% 4%4%
61% 22% 9% 4%4%
37% 29% 19% 10% 5%
22% 34% 23% 13% 8%
18% 26% 25% 15% 16%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
A Turkish military base somewhere in the northern part of Cyprus, which will
be given to Turkey in return for the cancellation of the 1960 Treaties of
Guarantee and Alliance.
Several thousand (from 3,000 to 6,000) Greek soldiers and an equal number of
Turkish soldiers
950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers as per the 1960 Treaty of Alliance
to be phased out as and when Turkey joins the EU
950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers as per the 1960 Treaty of Alliance
to remain in Cyprus indefinitely or until both communities agree that their
presence is no longer required
A common Cypriot‐Greek‐Turkish security force that will be serving together in
missions outside Cyprus within the context of the European Security and
Defence Policy
A unified bicommunal security force, comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots, that will be serving in UN Peacekeeping Missions abroad
A unified bicommunal security force, comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots, under the control of the federal government and charged with various
matters related to the security of Cyprus
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential  
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Figure 22b. On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a Comprehensive Settlement, how much 
would you be willing or unwilling to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (Turkish Cypriots - responses 
for Cypriot, Turkish and Greek troops) 
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55% 21% 15% 4%5%
32% 28% 22% 11% 7%
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to be phased out as and when Turkey joins the EU
A unified bicommunal security force, comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots, that will be serving in UN Peacekeeping Missions abroad
A unified bicommunal security force, comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots, under the control of the federal government and charged with various
matters related to the security of Cyprus
A common Cypriot‐Greek‐Turkish security force that will be serving together in
missions outside Cyprus within the context of the European Security and
Defence Policy
A Turkish military base somewhere in the northern part of Cyprus, which will
be given to Turkey in return for the cancellation of the 1960 Treaties of
Guarantee and Alliance.
Several thousand (from 3,000 to 6,000) Greek soldiers and an equal number of
Turkish soldiers
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Figure 23a. On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a Comprehensive Settlement, how much 
would you be willing or unwilling to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (Greek Cypriots - responses 
for third party troops) 
74% 18% 4 23
56% 17% 14% 8% 5%
35% 24% 19% 12% 10%
25% 29% 21% 15% 11%
9% 24% 26% 19% 21%
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British troops that will be camped in the Sovereign Base Areas as they are
today
A NATO force that will be in charge of the overall Security of Cyprus, and
assuming that Cyprus will in the meantime also have become a full
member of NATO
An International Force with a full Chapter 7 Security Council mandate, with
the authorisation to intervene using force if necessary, and which will
remain in Cyprus until all sides jointly agree that its presence is no longer
required
A European Security Force comprised of soldiers from various European
countries, including Turkey and Greece, and charged with various matters
related to the security of Cyprus
A UN Force that will be the successor of today’s UNFICYP, which will be
overseeing matters related to the implementation of the solution, and
which will remain in Cyprus until all sides jointly agree that its presence is
no longer required
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
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Figure 23b. On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a Comprehensive Settlement, how much 
would you be willing or unwilling to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (Turkish Cypriots - responses 
for third party troops) 
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the authorisation to intervene using force if necessary, and which will
remain in Cyprus until all sides jointly agree that its presence is no longer
required
A European Security Force comprised of soldiers from various European
countries, including Turkey and Greece, and charged with various matters
related to the security of Cyprus
A NATO force that will be in charge of the overall Security of Cyprus, and
assuming that Cyprus will in the meantime also have become a full
member of NATO
A UN Force that will be the successor of today’s UNFICYP, which will be
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Regarding the issue of the British bases, an important footnote is in 
order: Turkish Cypriots reject the continued presence of British troops 
stationed in the Sovereign Base Areas (57% unacceptable), just as the Greek 
Cypriots do (74% unacceptable). The fact that both communities agree that 
Britain’s military presence in Cyprus is unwelcome must be interpreted 
thoughtfully. The current mainstream thinking on the SBAs is that it will be 
kept separate from the process leading to a settlement – in other words, it is 
simply not part of the current peace process.18 Yet given these very high 
levels of unpopularity19 one could reasonably infer that in the case of a 
settlement it would not be long before the new federal government would 
seek to re-negotiate the status of the British bases. Causes that rally inter-
communal support in matters of foreign and security policy will be hard to 
find during the early post-settlement years, and therefore turning against 
the SBAs will be a way for political leaders of both communities to boost 
their popularity and forge inter-communal unity. With this in mind, it 
might be in Britain’s best interest to engage now in a dialogue to clarify the 
future of the bases as part of the settlement agreement. Options to consider 
in this dialogue might for instance include offering to put the SBAs under a 
broader ESDP umbrella while remaining under British administration, 
repeating the offer originally made in 2004 to relinquish to unified Cyprus 
agricultural lands in the vicinity of the SBAs, offering to pay rent to the 
federal government for the use of its territory, and offering to re-evaluate 
the legal status of the bases in line with contemporary international norms. 
Such a creative course of action would not only protect British interests 
                                                     
18 The status of the SBAs is governed by the 1960 Treaty of Establishment, and in this 
sense is semi-independent of Greek-Turkish-Cypriot security issues as these relate to 
the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. The Greek Cypriot leadership, concerned as it is 
with the legal continuity of the Republic of Cyprus, does not wish to delve into an 
extensive discussion of the Treaty of Establishment in the current negotiations.  
19 The unpopularity of the British SBAs can be interpreted both in terms of historical 
connotations and of current image. Greek Cypriots especially tend to espouse the 
narrative that the UK pursued a ‘divide and rule’ policy in Cyprus during the 1950s 
and 1960s which then led directly to the 1963 and eventually the 1974 events. More 
recently, Britain has been accused of interfering in the design of the Annan Plan in such 
a way as to secure its own strategic interests vis-à-vis  the SBAs, while in 2007 and 2008 
minor diplomatic crises erupted over Britain’s signing of strategic partnership 
agreements and memorandums of understanding, firstly with Turkey and then with 
the Republic of Cyprus. As a result of all this, the popularity of Britain and of the SBAs 
is low in both communities but especially in the Greek Cypriot one. 
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more effectively than transferring the vagueness of the current status quo 
into the new state of affairs, it would also make the plan more popular in 
both communities, while making it easier for Turkey to consider overall 
alterations to the security status quo. 
5. Property: Return and Compensation 
Property has been identified as the second issue of “core concern” for both 
communities. The first round of talks on the property dossier was opened 
in January 2009 and concluded in March 2009 with major divergences 
between the positions of the parties principally on the question of return 
versus compensation. Indeed when put in these terms, the positions of the 
two communities diverge widely. Quoting from our first survey we found 
that 91% of Greek Cypriots felt that the property issue should be solved 
primarily through restitution, but 52% of Turkish Cypriots viewed this as 
entirely unacceptable.20  
Yet moving away from general terms and seasoned labels, our second 
survey found that greater convergence is possible when Cypriots are asked 
about which categories of property they would be willing to consider 
return or compensation (see Figures 24a and 24b). Both communities 
concur that return could be foreseen for currently unused properties (99% 
of Greek Cypriots and 67% of Turkish Cypriots support or are open to 
restitution), for properties that are only partly being used and do not 
constitute primary residences nor are vital for income generation (99% of 
Greek Cypriots and 55% of Turkish Cypriots support or are open to 
restitution), and for properties used by third country nationals as 
residences or holiday homes (99% of Greek Cypriots and 58% of Turkish 
Cypriots support or are open to restitution). There could instead be 
compensation or a mix of restitution and compensation for properties 
where public utilities are built (67% of Greek Cypriots and 84% of Turkish 
Cypriots support or are open to compensation). Concerning properties that 
have been built in formerly empty plots (41% of Greek Cypriots and 79% of 
Turkish Cypriots support or are open to compensation), properties with 
significant improvements (41% of Greek Cypriots and 79% of Turkish 
Cypriots support or are open to compensation), and commercial properties 
used for income generation (31% of Greek Cypriots and 76% of Turkish 
Cypriots support or are open to this option).  
                                                     
20 Kaymak, Lordos & Tocci (2008) , op. cit., p. 38.  
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Figure 24a. Regarding the Property issue, the most important decision to be made in the negotiations is whether particular 
properties will be returned to their pre 1963/1974 owners or whether instead their ownership will pass to the 
current user and the original owner will be compensated for the loss of his property. For each of these categories 
of property, which types of resolution would you be willing to consider? (Greek Cypriots) 
5% 12% 50% 10% 23%
13 37% 16% 43%
12 38% 16% 43%
12 28% 19% 50%
1 2 24% 9% 56%
3 19% 19% 59%
1 17% 14% 68%
1 15% 16% 68%
1 7% 12% 80%
7% 11% 81%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Originally privately owned properties on which public utilities have in the
meantime been constructed.
Properties that used to be empty plots before 1963/1974 but now have
homes or apartments built on them
Properties on which significant improvements have been made, to the
extent that their real value has increased by more than 50%
Properties currently used as factories, shops, or offices
Properties that host churches, mosques, cemeteries, and other such
religious monuments
Properties where displaced persons from the other community currently live
Properties currently used by nationals of other countries, as residences or
holiday homes
Partly used properties, that are not currently vital either as residences or
for income generation
Properties where immigrants from Turkey currently live
Currently unused properties
Such properties must definitely remain with current users It would be preferable if such properties remain with current users
I am open to both alternative solutions for such properties It would be preferable if such properties were returned to original owners
Such properties must definitely be returned to original owners  
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Figure 24b. Regarding the Property issue, the most important decision to be made in the negotiations is whether particular 
properties will be returned to their pre 1963/1974 owners or whether instead their ownership will pass to the 
current user and the original owner will be compensated for the loss of his property. For each of these categories 
of property, which types of resolution would you be willing to consider? (Turkish Cypriots) 
46% 25% 15% 4% 9%
38% 31% 15% 7% 9%
33% 28% 18% 12% 9%
28% 32% 19% 11% 10%
28% 29% 19% 10% 14%
20% 31% 21% 11% 18%
20% 26% 24% 14% 17%
19% 26% 23% 13% 19%
18% 25% 21% 17% 20%
14% 18% 19% 16% 32%
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Properties that host churches, mosques, cemeteries, and other such
religious monuments
Originally privately owned properties on which public utilities have in the
meantime been constructed
Properties on which significant improvements have been made, to the
extent that their real value in has increased by more than 50%
Properties that used to be empty plots before 1963/1974 but now have
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Properties where immigrants from Turkey currently live
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Properties lived in by displaced persons from the other community
Properties currently used by nationals of other countries, as residences or
holiday homes
Currently unused properties
Such properties must definitely remain with current users It would be preferable if such properties remain with current users
I am open to both alternative solutions for such properties It would be preferable if such properties were returned to original owners
Such properties must definitely be returned to original owners  
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Moving on to the more controversial cases, the issue of properties 
being used by ‘settlers’ (99% of Greek Cypriots and 49% of Turkish 
Cypriots supporting or accepting restitution) calls for further exploration. 
On the one hand, the strength of sentiment of Greek Cypriots on this issue, 
ranking second only to the demand that unused properties be returned, 
cannot be ignored. In a scenario whereby these properties remain with 
current users (that is, settlers from Turkey) who would take precedence 
over original Greek Cypriot owners, one can expect the issue to operate as a 
very effective rallying cry in a future referendum campaign in favour of a 
‘No’ vote in the Greek Cypriot community. On the other hand, simply 
evicting ‘settlers’ from the residences they are currently using without 
offering a viable alternative for these groups and individuals to sustain 
themselves with dignity is going to lead to more problems in the future, 
when an increase in the crime rate and other indicators of social tension 
may be evidenced. Perhaps an appropriate solution might be for new 
homes to be built for those ‘settlers’ who will be staying, on state-owned 
land, to be financed possibly by the international community – while at the 
same time the original Greek Cypriot owners will have their homes 
unconditionally returned to them, thus satisfying their sense of justice (see 
Figure 3) and softening the blow of the realisation that a certain number of 
‘settlers’ will inevitably remain in Cyprus after a settlement. 
Regarding religious properties (e.g. Greek Orthodox churches in the 
north, Muslim mosques in the south) a troubling picture emerges. While a 
clear majority of Greek Cypriots insists that such properties should be 
returned (56% must definitely be returned, only 3% compensation is 
preferable), about half of Turkish Cypriots strongly reject the restitution of 
religious properties (46% must definitely remain with current users). While 
eventually and for numerous reasons – support of the Greek Cypriot 
position by the Council of Europe, fear that unless such properties are 
returned the Church will convince Greek Cypriots to vote ‘No’ – it is 
probable that religious properties will be restituted, the strength of Turkish 
Cypriot sentiment on this matter needs to be understood and addressed. It 
was noted earlier that Turkish Cypriots are very sensitive to cultural issues; 
specifically on maintaining their cultural and communal identity. What 
seems to be at play here is not so much a desire by Turkish Cypriots to 
limit the religious freedom of Greek Cypriots (Turkish Cypriots rank the 
granting of religious freedom in the ‘other’ constituent state just as highly 
as Greek Cypriots – see Figure 36b), but rather a fear that if all these 
churches are returned and allowed to function again – essentially at least 
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one church in the central square of almost every village in the north – this 
would amount to a ‘cultural invasion’ of the Greek Orthodox Church in 
what are currently Turkish Cypriot communities. Solutions might need to 
be sought here through in-depth social research on the ground and through 
the example of other multi-cultural and multi-religious cities in Europe, to 
see how similar problems have been addressed and resolved elsewhere. 
Finally, the most important case of properties that are currently used 
by refugees of the other community (Greek Cypriot properties in the north 
used by Turkish Cypriot refugees, Turkish Cypriot properties in the south 
used by Greek Cypriot refugees) has unfortunately not been resolved in the 
survey. Although a question was included on this matter, in the end the 
failure to specify and distinguish between the two different cases rendered 
the question ‘double-barrelled’ and therefore invalid from a 
methodological point of view. It would seem that Turkish Cypriots read 
the question to mean ‘Turkish Cypriot properties used by Greek Cypriots 
in the south’, and on that basis insisted that such properties be returned to 
original owners, not realising that such a scheme would then also apply for 
Greek Cypriot properties that they themselves are using in the north. In a 
future survey it would be interesting to distinguish between these two 
different cases and see if responses remain the same across both types, thus 
indicating a position of principle, or whether the responses diverge, which 
would indicate a more opportunistic approach to the property issue.  
Turning to the details of compensation for those properties that will 
not be returned, here we find significant scope for convergence between the 
two communities, with the Turkish Cypriot side in particular being open to 
all options. Greek Cypriot respondents also accept most options, with a 
preference for cash without delay (a mere 13% reject this), although a 
strong minority rejects compensation through guaranteed bonds (37% 
against and an additional 24% find this merely tolerable) (see Figures 25a 
and 25b). Many Greek Cypriots do not trust the financial system and equity 
markets and feel that even guaranteed bonds would not be sufficiently 
guaranteed, leaving them with worthless pieces of paper in their hands. 
The stock market crash of 2001-2, when many Greek Cypriots lost their 
fortunes, has also conditioned this mistrustful response to any type of 
‘financial markets’ solution. The most important message to take away 
from these findings, however, is that given a credible compensation system 
the support for compensation increases; this in turn grants greater 
flexibility to the negotiators to devise solutions to the property issue that 
will be feasible to agree and implement. 
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Figure 25a. Regarding those properties that for whatever reason might not be returned to their original owners, how 
acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these alternative forms of compensation? (Greek Cypriots) 
37% 24% 14% 11% 14%
19% 24% 20% 19% 18%
18% 24% 20% 21% 17%
17% 24% 20% 18% 22%
13% 19% 15% 22% 32%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Original owners to be compensated with guaranteed bonds, which they
will be able to redeem for cash at their expiration or alternatively sell
the bonds in the free market whenever they wish
Original owners to be invited to choose from a range of properties of
equivalent value, anywhere in Cyprus
Original owners to be compensated with properties of equivalent value
in the same town or village as their original property
Original owners to be compensated with properties of equivalent value
that are now in areas under the control of their own community
Original owners to be compensated in cash and without delay
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
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Figure 25b. Regarding those properties that for whatever reason might not be returned to their original owners, how 
acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these alternative forms of compensation? 
(Turkish Cypriots) 
20% 23% 29% 12% 16%
19% 24% 29% 14% 15%
13% 26% 26% 18% 17%
13% 25% 32% 12% 17%
28% 20% 16% 14% 22%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Original owners to be compensated with properties of equivalent value
that are now in areas under the control of their own community
Original owners to be invited to choose from a range of properties of
equivalent value, anywhere in Cyprus
Original owners to be compensated with guaranteed bonds, which they
will be able to redeem for cash at their expiration or alternatively sell
the bonds in the free market whenever they wish
Original owners to be compensated with properties of equivalent value
in the same town or village as their original property
Original owners to be compensated in cash and without delay
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential  
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6. Governance: Decision-making, Representation and 
Competences  
Governance also tops the list of concerns of the Cypriots, with both 
communities placing a special emphasis on governance and related 
questions (63% of Greek Cypriots and 53% of Turkish Cypriots stating that 
achieving a functional and democratic state is among their five top motives 
for a settlement, Figure 3, while 44% of Turkish Cypriot and 39% of Greek 
Cypriot swing voters state that they will pay special attention to the 
governance and power sharing provisions of the plan before deciding their 
vote in a future referendum, Figure 14). Governance was the first dossier to 
be tackled in the direct negotiations launched in September 2008, and the 
first round of governance-related talks in which the parties tabled their 
respective positions ended in January 2009. Whereas the leaders reached 
some degree of consensus on issues such as the distribution of 
competences, significant divergence has been reported on the composition, 
functioning and representation of the executive, as well as on the legal 
status of the new state and in particular on the vexed question of state 
succession.21 Beyond the negotiations however, what do Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots think and want? What governance arrangements 
would they accept and can their voices aid the search for a settlement at 
elite levels?  
The Annan Plan had ingenuously sought to detour the many riddles 
bedevilling agreement on a presidential system by discarding the 
traditional 1960 constitution solution of a presidency/vice presidency and 
opting for a presidential council instead.22 The idea underpinning the 
                                                     
21 The Greek Cypriot side insists that the new Cyprus would emerge and evolve from 
the existing Republic of Cyprus, claiming that accepting the notion of a federation 
already entails a maximum level of compromise made by Makarios back in 1977. At the 
outset of the current round of talks, the Greek Cypriot side has also attempted to water 
down the federal features of the agreement by referring to “constituent provinces” 
rather than “constituent states” as per the Annan Plan. See Stefanos Evripidou (2008), 
“The really tough talks start now”, Cyprus Mail, 4 September. 
22 The presidential council proposed by the Annan Plan comprised nine members (of 
which at least two Turkish Cypriot voting members, and one Turkish Cypriot non-
voting member), within which there would be a rotating presidency (with a president 
and a vice from different constituent states rotating every twenty months). The council 
would be elected on a single list by special majority in the senate and approved by 
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presidential council was both that of avoiding hierarchical relations 
between the communities by downplaying the issue of rotation as well as 
encouraging cohesiveness within the executive through elections through a 
single electoral ticket. Appealing as this idea may have been, our survey 
suggests that the presidential council runs into all sorts of obstacles because 
of issues of ratios of representation and voting as well as because the 
Turkish Cypriots feel very strongly that there should not be a common 
ticket presidency/executive. This is interesting to note, considering that the 
Turkish Cypriot side in the current round of UN sponsored negotiations 
has expressed its preference for a presidential council system over the 
presidential system. 
On the question of ratios within the presidential council, we found 
significant divergence between the communities, with Greek Cypriots 
strongly rejecting equality (4:4) (93% strongly against), and Turkish 
Cypriots strongly rejecting minority representation (4:3 – 62% strongly 
against, and 4:2 – 86% strongly against). Also as far as the elections of a 
presidential council is concerned, we note stark divergence, with Turkish 
Cypriots rejecting anything short of full equality in voting power (68% of 
Turkish Cypriots would reject a 40% Turkish Cypriot say in a single ticket 
election, while 89% of Turkish Cypriots would reject a 20-25% Turkish 
Cypriot say in a single ticket election), and Greek Cypriots only accepting a 
20-25% Turkish Cypriot say in a single ticket election (94% of Greek 
Cypriots would support or tolerate this solution but strong majorities 
would reject anything other than such a scheme of voting power in 
proportion to the population). It could be argued that the question of ratios 
would not go away under a presidency/vice presidency insofar as it would 
represent itself on the question of rotation time periods as well as on the 
issue of ratios for the appointment of federal ministers. However, these 
would arguably be less high profile and therefore less contentious than 
having to directly elect a ticket with specific ratios of representation and 
voting power (see Figures 29a, 29b, 30a, 30b).    
                                                                                                                                       
majority in the chamber of deputies. The idea of a presidential council (modelled on the 
Swiss constitution) was an ingenious way of escaping the deadlock between the parties 
on whether there should be a rotating presidency or not. The Annan Plan took up the 
idea of rotation, called for by the Turkish Cypriot side, but by introducing the idea of a 
presidential council it diminished the importance of the rotating presidency, thus 
taking Greek Cypriot concerns into account.  
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Figure 29a. And if they do run together as one team, how much of a say do you 
believe each community should have in the election of such a 
presidential team? (Greek Cypriots) 
94% 4%
59% 30% 8%2%
6% 15% 21% 23% 35%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The voting power of the two communities to be
equal, i.e. 50% for Greek Cypriots and 50% for
Turkish Cypriots.
The voting power to be at a ratio of 60% for
Greek Cypriots and 40% for Turkish Cypriots.
The voting power to be in accordance with the
population, i.e. about 75 – 80% for Greek
Cypriots and 20 – 25% for Turkish Cypriots.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole
Highly desirable Absolutely Essential  
Figure 29b. And if they do run together as one team, how much of a say do you 
believe each community should have in the election of such a 
presidential team? (Turkish Cypriots) 
89% 6%4%
68% 15% 10%3 4
4%7% 14% 16% 60%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The voting power to be in accordance with the
population, i.e. about 75 – 80% for Greek
Cypriots and 20 – 25% for Turkish Cypriots.
The voting power to be at a ratio of 60% for
Greek Cypriots and 40% for Turkish Cypriots.
The voting power of the two communities to be
equal, i.e. 50% for Greek Cypriots and 50% for
Turkish Cypriots.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole
Highly desirable Absolutely Essential  
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Figure 30a. Regarding the composition of the presidency, how acceptable or 
unacceptable do you consider each of these ratios of representation 
between the two communities? (Greek Cypriots) 
93% 4%
70% 23% 5%
17% 23% 20% 20% 19%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Four Greek Cypriots to
Four Turkish Cypriots.
 Four Greek Cypriots to
Three Turkish Cypriots.
Four Greek Cypriots to
Two Turkish Cypriots.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole
Highly desirable Absolutely Essential  
 
Figure 30b. Regarding the composition of the presidency, how acceptable or 
unacceptable do you consider each of these ratios of representation 
between the two communities? (Turkish Cypriots) 
86% 10%
62% 18% 11%4%4%
4%6% 18% 17% 55%
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Four Greek Cypriots to Two Turkish Cypriots.
 Four Greek Cypriots to Three Turkish Cypriots.
Four Greek Cypriots to Four Turkish Cypriots.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole
Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
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Interestingly, both communities prefer the traditional president/vice 
president team, though the matter is more nuanced for Greek Cypriots 
(51% of the Greek Cypriots supporting a president/vice president team 
and 36% supporting a presidential council, 62% of Turkish Cypriots 
supporting a president/vice president team and 24% a presidential 
council), being elected through direct elections (73% of the Turkish 
Cypriots and 95% of the Greek Cypriots preferring direct elections). 
Particularly interesting is also the fact that both communities concur that 
candidates for president/vice president should run for election separately 
within each community, though again the matter is more nuanced in the 
Greek Cypriot community (78% of the Turkish Cypriots preferring separate 
elections of the executive and 14% preferring a shared ticket, 48% of Greek 
Cypriots preferring separate elections and 44% preferring a shared ticket).23 
(See Figures 26, 27, 28) 
Figure 26. Whichever form the presidency takes, do you prefer that the presidency 
is elected by the federal senate, or directly by the people? 
3%
16%
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11%
95%
73%
0%
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40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Greek Cypriots Turkish Cypriots
Prefer that the Presidency is elected by the Federal Senate
Ambivalent on this issue
Prefer that the Presidency is elected directly by the people
 
                                                     
23 Opposing the idea of a single ticket election of the presidency on the grounds that 
this would allow Greek Cypriots to determine the Turkish Cypriot president/vice see 
Nicos Rolandis (2009) ‘The beautiful people, enosis, partition…and our bloody mess’, 
Cyprus Mail, 17 February.  
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Figure 27. One important issue in the current negotiations is the presidency of the 
new federal government. In relation to this matter, would you prefer a 
presidential council or a president/vice-president team? 
39%
24%
11% 14%
51%
62%
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40%
50%
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70%
Greek Cypriots Turkish Cypriots
Prefer to have a Presidential Council
Ambivalent on this issue
Prefer to have a President / Vice President Team  
 
Figure 28. Regarding the manner in which the representatives of the two 
communities to the presidency will be elected, do you prefer that the 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots run together as one team, or that 
they run for election separately in each community and then the 
winners of each community come together and form the presidency? 
44%
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Prefer that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots run together for election as one team
Ambivalent on this issue
Prefer that they run for election separately in each community and then the winners of each
community come together to form the Presidency  
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The essence of a cooperative executive dealing with bicommunal 
federal issues embedded in the Annan Plan’s presidential council could 
however be salvaged by allowing for separate elections of the 
president/vice president but inserting an element of cross-voting in these 
separate elections. While the Turkish Cypriots strongly oppose single ticket 
elections with anything short of 50% representation, the idea of cross-
voting is not rejected outright by either community. As far as the election of 
federal officials is concerned, majorities of both communities are prepared 
to accept or at the very least consider weighted cross-voting (60% of the 
Greek Cypriots and 68% of the Turkish Cypriots). One could thus imagine 
that each community would have a small say (15-20%) in the election of the 
executive representative of the other community. An element of cross-
voting might correct the problems that could arise by having separate 
tickets, since it would support the election of leaders concerned with both 
mono-communal and inter-communal issues, while gradually encouraging 
– in the medium term – all political parties and leaders to update and 
broaden their political platforms and narratives to be more compatible with 
the new federal structure of government and the multiple layers of policy-
making and political representation (Figure 31). 
Figure 31. More broadly regarding the manner of election of federal officials, and as 
a matter of principle, do you prefer mono-communal voting or weighted 
cross-voting? (concepts explained in detail) 
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Turning to decision-making within the executive, our survey 
predictably found that either one community or the other rejects both the 
option of single majority voting (51% of Turkish Cypriots view this as 
unacceptable and 20% as merely tolerable) and of veto rights (50% of Greek 
Cypriots view this as unacceptable and 26% as merely tolerable). 
Convergence is instead possible on the two compromise solutions of either 
having minority support from each community (with 80% of Greek 
Cypriots and 83% of Turkish Cypriots accepting this solution) or 50% 
support from each community (with 77% of Turkish Cypriots and 53% of 
Greek Cypriots accepting or tolerating this solution). Hence under a 
hypothetical president/vice president team that appoints its council of 
ministers, decisions would still have to be made as if under a presidential 
council by voting procedures that would ensure a degree of consent from 
both communities.24 (See Figures 32a and 32b) 
                                                     
24 The manner of selection of federal ministers presents both a challenge and an 
opportunity. Given the strong sensitivities of both communities on the matter of ratios 
as evidenced in this poll, one solution might be to maintain the ministerial ratios of 2:1 
that were proposed in the Annan Plan (i.e. four Greek Cypriot ministers and two 
Turkish Cypriot ministers) while at the same time establishing a cross-nomination 
method whereby the Turkish Cypriot leader would nominate candidates for half the 
ministerial posts, and the Greek Cypriot leader would nominate candidates for the 
other half (i.e. each of them would nominate two Greek Cypriots and one Turkish 
Cypriot). Given that the ministers will have a formal voting right in the council of 
ministers, it would also be appropriate that the ministers be first ratified by the federal 
senate before taking up their posts. 
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Figure 32a. Another important matter related to the federal presidency is the manner in which decisions will be made. In this 
regard, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of these options? (Greek Cypriots) 
50% 26% 13% 5 5
47% 25% 16% 8%4
21% 35% 28% 11%6%
10% 22% 31% 21% 16%
0% 50% 100%
All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but
the President and Vice‐President will each possess the right to
veto any decision on behalf of their community.
All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but
within that supporting majority there must be at least 50%
support from the representatives of each community.
All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but
within that supporting majority there must be at least minority
support from the representatives of each community.
 All executive decisions will be made by simple majority in the
council.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
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Figure 32b. Another important matter related to the federal presidency is the manner in which decisions will be made. In this 
regard, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of these options?(Turkish Cypriots) 
51% 20% 15% 7%8%
23% 17% 26% 16% 18%
18% 22% 33% 17% 11%
14% 21% 24% 13% 28%
0% 50% 100%
 All executive decisions will be made by simple majority in the
council.
All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but
within that supporting majority there must be at least 50%
support from the representatives of each community.
All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but
within that supporting majority there must be at least minority
support from the representatives of each community.
All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but
the President and Vice‐President will each possess the right to
veto any decision on behalf of their community.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential
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A final critical issue pertaining to governance is the distribution of 
competences, which would effectively determine the degree of 
decentralisation of governance in the new state. Here we note an 
interesting contrast confirming the hypothesis that as far as Cyprus is 
concerned, the devil is not, in fact, in the detail. When asked about general 
preferences regarding support for a more centralised or decentralised 
system, the two communities are at loggerheads with each other, with 
Greek Cypriots supporting a strong federal government (67%) and Turkish 
Cypriots preferring strong constituent states (62%) (Figure 34). By contrast, 
when delving into the details of competence allocation, the two 
communities largely see eye-to-eye. They concur that health, 
transport/infrastructure, environment/energy/natural resources, foreign 
policy and trade/industry/tourism would be shared competences (which 
could mean either a federal competence or constituent state competences 
governed through coordination agreements between the two constituent 
states). Both also concur that education and the supervision of cultural 
heritage would be communal competences (which could either mean a 
constituent state competence or perhaps a true ‘communal’ competence 
where each community would take care of its own education and 
supervision of cultural heritage regardless of where in Cyprus these are 
located). Issues that fall in the grey zone with community preferences 
either diverging or having strong minorities against allocating the 
competence in question to one level or another include the supervision of 
the police and of the banking sector, security/defence, labour/social policy, 
and citizenship/human rights/asylum/immigration, which could be 
mixed competences distributed between the two levels (see Figures 33a and 
33b).  
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Figure 33a. Finally in the dossier of Governance and Power-sharing, the issue of the distribution of competences has also 
been discussed a lot recently in the negotiations. The important matter that needs to be decided is which of the 
following competences will be administered by each community separately, and which will be administered by 
the two communities working together. For each of these competences, do you prefer that your community 
separately manages its affairs on the issue or do you prefer that the two communities work together on the issue? 
(Greek Cypriots) 
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36% 12% 53%
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Figure 33b. Finally in the dossier of Governance and Power-sharing, the issue of the distribution of competences has also 
been discussed a lot recently in the negotiations. The important matter that needs to be decided is which of the 
following competences will be administered by each community separately, and which will be administered by 
the two communities working together. For each of these competences, do you prefer that your community 
separately manages its affairs on the issue or do you prefer that the two communities work together on the issue? 
(Turkish Cypriots) 
50% 13% 38%
46% 11% 43%
42% 14% 44%
37% 17% 46%
40% 14% 47%
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Figure 34. More broadly on the issue of competences, and as a matter of principle, 
would you say that you prefer a strong federal government or that you 
prefer strong constituent states? (concepts explained in detail) 
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7. Rights, Freedoms and the Meaning of Bizonality 
Issues pertaining to rights and freedoms within the new state constitute 
another matter of significant concern to both communities, albeit with 
slightly different slants and emphases. For Greek Cypriots, the emphasis is 
on ‘being able to live and work anywhere in Cyprus’ (important motive for 
54% of Greek Cypriots and 48% of Turkish Cypriots), while for Turkish 
Cypriots the emphasis is on ‘preserving our cultural identity and the 
cultural identity of our land’ (important motive for 54% of Turkish 
Cypriots and 45% of Greek Cypriots) (see Figure 3). Here again we note 
that the scope for convergence is narrow but nonetheless possible. Among 
the proposed frameworks for dealing with the issue of relocation by 
members of one community into the area governed by the other 
community, the only option the Turkish Cypriots actively favour is that of 
relocation simply not being allowed in the other community’s constituent 
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state (61% viewing this as essential, desirable or satisfactory), whereas all 
other options receive significant minority rejection by the Turkish Cypriots 
(ranging between 42% and 47% rejection rates). However, looking at the 
glass as half-full rather than half-empty, we note that slim majorities of 
Turkish Cypriots would accept or tolerate all options, the most acceptable 
being the proposal to have quotas for voting rights but not for the right to 
work and live throughout the island (58% acceptable or tolerable), village-
by-village quotas (57% acceptable or tolerable), no quotas whatsoever (56% 
acceptable or tolerable),25 quotas only for designated regions on the island 
(55% acceptable or tolerable), and an overall quota regulating resettlement 
(53% acceptable or tolerable). Interestingly, the differences in Turkish 
Cypriot support/rejection between these options highlighting different 
degrees and types of restrictions to rights and freedoms are rather small. 
Turning instead to the Greek Cypriots we note that Greek Cypriots would 
only accept or tolerate either no quotas at all (86% accept or tolerate) or the 
establishment of quotas only on voting rights (65% accept or tolerate). Of 
these two options, given the Greek Cypriots’ particularly acute concern for 
this matter alongside Turkish Cypriot preference for quotas on voting 
rights, we could imagine that quotas would only be exercised on voting 
rights whereas the right to live and work would be extended to all citizens 
throughout the island (see Figures 35a and 35b).  
 
                                                     
25 The willingness of Turkish Cypriots to consider not having any quotas whatsoever is 
surprising given the emphasis that they place on ‘the preservation of their cultural 
identity’, even in this poll. One explanation might be that Turkish Cypriots no longer 
believe that mass relocation by Greek Cypriots to the north is likely even if the right 
was not regulated. In practice however, and in a dynamic pre-referendum 
environment, one might reasonably infer that the lack of any quotas would be strongly 
emphasised by the Turkish Cypriot ‘No’ campaign and thus awaken cultural 
insecurities regarding this issue. 
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Figure 35a. Moving on to the issue of individual rights, for any Greek Cypriots who will choose to live in the north and any 
Turkish Cypriots who will choose to live in the south after a Settlement, one issue that has often been discussed 
is how such rights will be regulated. In this context, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of these 
options? (Greek Cypriots) 
71% 13% 7% 4%5%
53% 28% 12% 4 3
51% 29% 14% 4 3
50% 26% 16% 6% 3
36% 27% 19% 12% 7%
14% 12% 17% 22% 35%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Such relocation would not be permitted: All Greek Cypriots would live in the south
and all Turkish Cypriots would live in the north after a settlement
There would be an overall quota regulating resettlement for the constituent state –
so for instance not more than one third of the residents in a whole constituent
state can come from the other community ‐ but individual villages may exceed that
number
There would be a quota regulating resettlement village by village – so for instance
in any specific village not more than one third of its residents can come from the
other community
There would be quotas and regulations in some regions of the island while in other
regions there will be no quotas or regulations, depending on the social and other
conditions that prevail locally
There would be a quota on how many from the other community can receive full
voting rights in the constituent state, but the right to live and work anywhere in
Cyprus would be exercised freely
There would not be any quotas or regulations, and individuals of both communities
will be free to live, work and exercise voting rights wherever they wish on the
island
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential  
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Figure 35b. Moving on to the issue of individual rights, for any Greek Cypriots who will choose to live in the north and any 
Turkish Cypriots who will choose to live in the south after a Settlement, one issue that has often been discussed 
is how such rights will be regulated. In this context, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of these 
options? (Turkish Cypriots) 
47% 28% 19% 4 3
45% 25% 18% 7% 5%
44% 21% 14% 11% 10%
43% 29% 20% 4 5
42% 23% 18% 11% 6%
24% 16% 18% 18% 25%
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– so for instance not more than one third of the residents in a whole constituent
state can come from the other community ‐ but individual villages may exceed that
number
There would be quotas and regulations in some regions of the island while in other
regions there will be no quotas or regulations, depending on the social and other
conditions that prevail locally
There would not be any quotas or regulations, and individuals of both communities
will be free to live, work and exercise voting rights wherever they wish on the
island
There would be a quota regulating resettlement village by village – so for instance
in any specific village not more than one third of its residents can come from the
other community
There would be a quota on how many from the other community can receive full
voting rights in the constituent state, but the right to live and work anywhere in
Cyprus would be exercised freely
Such relocation would not be permitted: All Greek Cypriots would live in the south
and all Turkish Cypriots would live in the north after a settlement
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential  
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Backing up this suggestion, when asked about specific rights granted 
to citizens living in the constituent state governed by the ‘other’ 
community, whereas Greek Cypriots support, to differing degrees, the 
extension of all rights and freedoms to all citizens, significant minorities of 
Turkish Cypriots reject or are uncomfortable about extending voting rights 
at constituent state (38% rejection), municipal (37% rejection) and federal 
levels (31% rejection). While receiving greater resistance than voting rights 
at federal level, it is however less viable to restrict voting rights at 
municipal level, as opposed to constituent state or federal level due to EU 
norms whereby all EU citizens may exercise voting rights at the municipal 
level wherever they reside in Europe. 
Turkish Cypriots are also concerned about extending the freedom to 
purchase property (38% rejection) and to start a business (35% rejection), 
probably because of the fear of being overrun by the more numerous and 
above all more affluent Greek Cypriot community. At the same time, 
Turkish Cypriots seem particularly attached to the right to get a job in the 
other constituent state (75% consider the granting of this right important) 
and the right to receive public benefits (63% consider the granting of this 
right important). These two findings taken together seem to indicate that 
the Turkish Cypriots consider access to the Greek Cypriot job market an 
important parameter of a settlement, a finding that should be read in light 
of the fact that, for Turkish Cypriots, ‘improving our economic situation’ 
ranks first in the list of motives for desiring a settlement (significant motive 
for 70% of Turkish Cypriots, see Figure 3). 
Hence, with the qualified exception of voting, property acquisition 
and business establishment rights, a solution that would meet most of the 
concerns of the Greek Cypriots could foresee extending a whole range of 
rights to citizens throughout the island, including religious freedoms, the 
right to receive education in their mother tongue, the freedom of 
movement, the right of employment and the right to receive public 
benefits. In practice and when broken down into specific rights and 
freedoms, Turkish Cypriots appear to be attached to the principle of 
bizonality to the extent that they do not feel overrun by Greek Cypriots 
either politically (i.e., voting rights) or financially (i.e., property and 
business rights) and are instead rather open to the coexistence of the two 
communities on the ground and the development of a multi-cultural 
society (see Figures 36a and 36b).  
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Figure 36a. Looking more specifically at the types of rights that Turkish Cypriots would have in the south and Greek 
Cypriots would have in the north, how do you see the granting of each of the following rights? (Greek Cypriots) 
15% 12% 9% 16% 48%
13% 9% 10% 20% 49%
15% 9% 8% 17% 51%
17% 7% 7% 17% 52%
14% 10%7% 17% 53%
16% 8% 7% 16% 54%
12% 8%6% 17% 57%
10% 8% 7% 15% 61%
9%5%5% 13% 68%
9%5%5%11% 70%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The right to receive public benefits
The right to start a business or buy an existing business
The right to purchase property 
The right to vote in federal elections for the representatives of the
constituent state they live in
The right to get a job
The right to vote in constituent state elections
The right to move around freely and visit any part of Cyprus
The right to vote in local municipal elections
The right to receive education in one’s own mother tongue
The right to religious worship in accordance with one’s own creed 
The granting of this right would make me very uncomfortable The granting of this right would make me somewhat uncomfortable
I am ambivalent about the granting of this right I consider the granting of this right important
I consider the granting of this right absolutely essential  
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Figure 36b. Looking more specifically at the types of rights that Turkish Cypriots would have in the south and Greek 
Cypriots would have in the north, how do you see the granting of each of the following rights? 
(Turkish Cypriots) 
30% 8%13%11% 39%
30% 8%14%9% 40%
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I consider the granting of this right absolutely essential  
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8. Territory and ‘Settlers’: An Inevitable Give-and-Take? 
The last two elements explored in our second survey regard the issues of 
territorial adjustments and the future status of immigrants from Turkey. 
Both issues are characterised by significant divergence between the 
communities and therefore agreement on both issues may be possible only 
through package deals across different dossiers. Beginning with territory, 
of the outlined options, Greek Cypriots would be willing to accept, in 
declining order, Varosha, Morphou and Karpas being returned to the 
Greek Cypriot administration (93%), Varosha and Morphou being returned 
to Greek Cypriot administration (93%), Varosha and Morphou being 
returned and the Karpas and Akamas peninsulas being converted into 
federal areas (75%) and Varosha and Morphou being returned and Nicosia 
being converted into a federal area (62%). By contrast, Turkish Cypriots 
essentially resist all territorial adjustments, with even the minimal 
adjustments of Varosha being returned to the Greek Cypriots, and Varosha, 
Morphou and Nicosia being converted into federal areas receiving a 65% 
and 62% rate of rejection respectively. This is predictable of course, in so far 
as territory, taken in isolation, is the one element on the conflict settlement 
agenda on which the Turkish Cypriots have everything to lose and nothing 
to gain (see Figures 37a and 37b).  
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Figure 37a. Regarding the Territorial aspect, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these schemes for 
territorial adjustment? (Greek Cypriots) 
63% 18% 8% 5% 7%
50% 26% 12% 8% 4%
38% 29% 15% 12% 5%
25% 27% 20% 19% 9%
7% 7% 11% 21% 54%
7% 6% 10% 22% 56%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Varosha only to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration.
Varosha, Morphou and Nicosia to be converted into Federal Areas under the direct
administration of the federal government.
Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration, Nicosia to
be converted into a Federal Area under the direct administration of the federal
government.
Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration, Karpasia
Peninsula and Akamas Peninsula to both be converted into ‘Federal Nature
Preserves’ under the direct administration of the federal government.
Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration.
Varosha, Morphou and Karpasia Peninsula to be returned under Greek Cypriot
administration.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential  
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Figure 37b. Regarding the Territorial aspect, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these schemes for 
territorial adjustment? (Turkish Cypriots) 
87% 7% 222
82% 8% 6%12
70% 18% 6% 3 3
73% 14% 8% 3 3
62% 23% 6%3%6%
65% 15% 7% 6% 6%
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Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration.
Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration, Nicosia to
be converted into a Federal Area under the direct administration of the federal
government.
Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration, Karpasia
Peninsula and Akamas Peninsula to both be converted into ‘Federal Nature
Preserves’ under the direct administration of the federal government.
Varosha, Morphou and Nicosia to be converted into Federal Areas under the direct
administration of the federal government.
Varosha only to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration.
Entirely Unacceptable Tolerable if necessary Satisfactory on the whole Highly desirable Absolutely Essential  
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One lesson to be drawn from these results is that territorial 
readjustments may be accepted by the Turkish Cypriots only if presented 
as a package, most prominently by including Greek Cypriot concessions on 
dossiers Turkish Cypriot also attach a high value to, such as governance, 
bizonality and, as we shall see below, ‘settlers’.26 Another complementary 
proposal might be to opt for the creation of some federal areas, possibly in 
the format of federal nature preserves including areas that are currently 
under Greek Cypriot control such as the Akamas Peninsula, as this would 
give the Turkish Cypriots an ‘up-side’ on the territorial adjustment dossier. 
With the exception of ‘Varosha only being returned to Greek Cypriot 
administration’, all the options in the survey that include some federal 
areas are somewhat more popular amongst the Turkish Cypriots than pure 
‘return of territories to Greek Cypriots’ options. Alongside Karpas and 
Akamas, perhaps a part of Troodos Mountains could also become a federal 
nature preserve insofar as this area is very popular to Turkish Cypriots 
who like to visit the mountains for weekends and holidays. In general, 
turning all these low-population and high tourist-interest areas (Akamas, 
Troodos, tip of Karpas) into federal areas has the added bonus of reducing 
the size of the Greek Cypriot state relative to the Turkish Cypriot one, and 
therefore the perceived imbalance between the two communities, which is 
a source of anxiety for the Turkish Cypriots.27 Concomitantly it would also 
partly satisfy the Greek Cypriot desire for territorial reintegration, which 
emerged as the motive for 50% of the Greek Cypriot respondents for 
wanting a solution; ranking fifth out of the ten designated options (see 
Figure 3). 
Turning to the question of Turkish immigrants and their status in a 
future Cyprus, here too we note significant divergence, with Greek 
Cypriots willing to accept a mix of citizenship and residence permits only 
for two categories of Turkish immigrants: those born in Cyprus of mixed 
Turkish/Cypriot parents (35% citizenship and 40% residence) and those 
                                                     
26 The whole concept of a bizonal, bicommunal federation for Cyprus is often described 
by commentators as a “land for power sharing” deal. 
27 Another innovative approach to include federal areas in a settlement entails 
converting the area where the federal government will be located – during the 2003/4 
peace process the area that is now the UN protected area had been earmarked for this 
purpose – into a federal zone that would not fall within the domain of either 
constituent state. 
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married to a Turkish Cypriot (25% citizenship and 37% residence). For all 
other categories of Turkish immigrants, large Greek Cypriot majorities 
favour either immediate or gradual departure. The Greek Cypriot 
preference for repatriation, while less acute, is also extended to attitudes 
towards immigrants from other non-EU nationalities, with immediate or 
gradual departure options being preferred for immigrants who have been 
in Cyprus for less as well as for more than ten years. Greek Cypriot 
intolerance for the presence of Turkish or other foreign nationals links back 
to the Greek Cypriot tendency to be suspicious of the multicultural 
transformation their community is currently undergoing, as captured in 
our first survey.28 
In stark contrast, Turkish Cypriots reject the repatriation of all 
categories of Turkish immigrants, including those who have been in 
Cyprus for less than ten years – though for this last category 47% of the 
Turkish Cypriots would be willing to consider a residence permit being 
granted, while 28% would favour repatriation and only 21% would prefer 
citizenship. Turkish Cypriot tolerance for the presence of Turkish 
immigrants is extended to attitudes towards other immigrants, where again 
repatriation is not recommended for any category of non-EU immigrants, 
including those who have been in Cyprus for less than ten years. The 
distinctly different attitudes between the two communities towards foreign 
nationals may reflect on the one hand the lower migratory pressures faced 
by the Turkish Cypriots, but on the other hand, their own desire to achieve 
a more ethnically diverse and multi-cultural society than they have today.29 
(See Figures 38a, 38b, 39a, 39b) 
                                                     
28 “Greek Cypriots in particular also appear to be maturing the potential for ethnic 
intolerance and xenophobia (probably not only towards Turkish Cypriots but also 
towards immigrants of other European countries), with only 8% of Greek Cypriots (as 
opposed to 37% TC) believing that ethnic diversity enriches life”. Kaymak, Lordos & 
Tocci (2008), op. cit., p. 21.  
29 Kaymak, Lordos & Tocci (2008), op. cit., p. 23.  
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Figure 38a. Regarding the persons who have come to the north from Turkey since the events of 1974, one important decision 
that will have to be made in the negotiations will be whether these persons can stay on in Cyprus after a 
Settlement or not. For each of these groups, which option or options would you find acceptable? (Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 38b. Regarding the persons who have come to the north from Turkey since the events of 1974, one important decision 
that will have to be made in the negotiations will be whether these persons can stay on in Cyprus after a 
Settlement or not. For each of these groups, which option or options would you find acceptable? 
(Turkish Cypriots) 
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Figure 39a. Regarding the persons who have come from non-EU third countries (e.g. from Russia, Lebanon, Pakistan etc.) 
and now live among Greek Cypriots one important decision that will have to be made in the negotiations will be 
whether these persons can stay on in Cyprus after a Settlement or not. For each of these groups, which option or 
options would you find acceptable? (Greek Cypriots) 
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Figure 39b. Regarding the persons who have come from non-EU third countries (e.g. from Russia, Lebanon, Pakistan etc.) 
and now live among Greek Cypriots one important decision that will have to be made in the negotiations will be 
whether these persons can stay on in Cyprus after a Settlement or not. For each of these groups, which option or 
options would you find acceptable? (Turkish Cypriots) 
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9. A People’s Peace in Cyprus? 
Taken together our two surveys suggest that an agreement in Cyprus is 
possible but it will be a hard sell to the people of both communities. What 
matters above all and more than the positions adopted by different actors 
in and surrounding the Cyprus conflict is the substance of the proposed 
deal itself, with core issues of concern being above all: security, property, 
governance, rights and freedoms, territory and settlers.  
Any agreement on security would have to reconcile strongly 
expressed Greek Cypriot concerns regarding Turkish military intervention 
with Turkish Cypriot desires that Turkey remain a credible guarantor of an 
agreement. Given bizonality and other facts related to any ‘new state of 
affairs’ the extant Treaty of Guarantee would require amendment anyway, 
as was the case when the Annan Plan blueprint called for additional 
protocols. Amending the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, however, runs a risk of 
not overcoming Greek Cypriots’ negative perceptions of the specific 
document, as evidenced in the current poll; with this in mind, a new treaty, 
designed in such a way as to also be acceptable to Turkish Cypriots, is a 
possible alternative to serve as the basis of a new security regime in 
Cyprus.   
While negotiating and designing the future security and treaty 
architecture of unified Cyprus is a delicate matter, which will require the 
committed and creative high level involvement of all relevant parties both 
in Cyprus and internationally, public opinion on the ground does seem to 
suggest specific elements that could be considered further by the formal 
negotiators. For one, the treaty could ‘unpack’ the security and 
implementation challenges that unified Cyprus may face in the future, 
differentiating between potential military threats, governance crises and 
instances of non-implementation of the agreement, defining for each a 
differentiated response mechanism that could, as needed in each case, 
involve the federal and constituent state governments in Cyprus, the 
governments of Greece and Turkey, the EU and the UN. Authorisation for 
action in cases of non-implementation remains problematic, since there is 
divergence on the issue of unilateral intervention rights as well as on 
whether the UN or the EU could also serve as enforcers in the case of non-
implementation. In this regard further research is called for, exploring 
alternative consensus models and suggesting ways in which future 
disagreements between the treaty signatories could be resolved.   
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Whatever the particular variation, the key point is that a new security 
regime serves as a potential point of convergence that could be potentially 
promoted by political leaders as a viable alternative to the status quo. This 
could also be combined with the creation of a bicommunal force, which 
together with Greek and Turkish troops would participate in UN 
peacekeeping and possibly ESDP missions abroad, as well as a renewed 
mandate for UNFICYP to monitor the implementation of the agreement on 
the ground (see Figure 40). 
Bicommunal consensus could also be reached on the property dossier 
with the breakdown of properties into different categories and the order of 
priority to decide whether a property would be returned or compensated 
for would vary between categories of property. Specifically, original 
owners could have priority in the cases of unused properties and 
properties used by ‘settlers’ or other non-Cypriots, while current users 
could have priority in the cases of properties on which public utilities have 
been built, or that are being used as shops and factories, or that have more 
generally been significantly improved and built upon. The most complex 
case to resolve is that of properties that are now being used by refugees 
from the other community as primary residences; for these types of 
properties, it is envisioned that a more specific set of criteria should be used 
to decide on who would have priority, though a give-and-take solution can 
be envisioned whereby priority for properties used by displaced persons 
remains with current users while priority for religious heritage sites is 
granted to original owners. More broadly, where properties would be 
compensated for rather than returned, a mix of different compensation 
schemes could be foreseen, including compensation in cash, and 
compensation with other properties of equivalent value, preferably 
avoiding the option of government bonds for which the Greek Cypriots 
have little enthusiasm (see Figure 41). 
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Figure 40. Proposed provisions in the Dossier of Security and Guarantees, compatible with the requirements and 
sensitivities of the wider Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Population 
DOSSIER THEME PROPOSAL 
ACCEPTABILITY 
IN GREEK 
CYPRIOT 
COMMUNITY 
ACCEPTABILITY 
IN TURKISH 
CYPRIOT 
COMMUNITY 
Security 
and 
Guarantees 
Treaty 
Architecture 
A new Treaty, or an amended version of the Treaty 
of Guarantee, to be signed between unified Cyprus, 
Turkey and Greece, that will clarify each side’s 
responsibility regarding the implementation of the 
agreement, in a spirit of equality between the 
signatory states. 
Moderate Moderate to High 
Security 
and 
Guarantees 
Treaty 
Architecture 
A set of guidelines to be agreed in advance by all 
the sides, clarifying the appropriate response and 
responsibility for each implementation-related 
challenge that may in the future arise. 
High High 
Security 
and 
Guarantees 
Troops 
A moderately sized professional security force to be 
established, bicommunal in composition, which 
will be responsible to defend the island from 
internal and external threats, while also serving in 
peacekeeping missions abroad. 
High High 
Security 
and 
Guarantees 
Troops 
A UN Force that will be the successor of today’s 
UNFICYP to be mandated, which will be 
overseeing matters related to the implementation of 
the solution, and which will remain in Cyprus until 
all sides jointly agree that its presence is no longer 
required 
High Moderate 
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Security 
and 
Guarantees 
Troops 
A common Cypriot-Greek-Turkish security force to 
be established, that will be serving together in 
missions outside Cyprus within the context of the 
European Security and Defence Policy 
Moderate to Low Moderate to High 
Security 
and 
Guarantees 
Supervision of 
Implementation 
Response by the EU and UN at a political / 
sanctions level in case of a governance crisis or of a 
crisis in the implementation of the terms of the 
agreement 
Moderate to High Moderate to High 
Security 
and 
Guarantees 
Supervision of 
Implementation 
Response by the UN at first instance, and then by 
the 'motherlands' as a last resort, in case of a 
military attack against one of the communities by 
the other community and/or its 'motherland' 
Low Moderate to High 
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Figure 41. Proposed order of priority, between original owners and current users, to decide on restitution v. compensation 
for different categories of properties affected by the Cyprus Problem 
TYPE OF PROPERTY DECISION PRIORITY 
ACCEPTABILITY 
IN GREEK 
CYPRIOT 
COMMUNITY 
ACCEPTABILITY 
IN TURKISH 
CYPRIOT 
COMMUNITY 
Currently unused properties Original Owners Very High Moderate to High 
Properties where immigrants from Turkey currently live Original Owners Very High Moderate 
Properties which are currently used by nationals of other 
countries (e.g. from Britain, Germany, Israel etc), as 
residences or holiday homes 
Original Owners Very High Moderate 
Partly used properties, that are not currently vital either 
as residences or for income generation Original Owners Very High Moderate 
Properties that host churches, mosques, cemeteries, and 
other such religious monuments (e.g. Orthodox churches 
in the north, mosques in the south) 
Original Owners Very High Low 
Originally privately owned properties on which public 
utilities – airports, hospitals, universities etc. have in the 
mean time been constructed 
Current Users Moderate Very High 
Properties that are currently used as factories, shops, or 
offices Current Users Moderate to Low Very High 
Properties that used to be empty plots before 1963/1974 
but now have homes or apartments built on them Current Users Moderate to Low Very High 
Properties on which significant improvements have been 
made, to the extent that their real value in current prices 
has been increased by more than 50% 
Current Users Moderate to Low Very High 
Properties where displaced persons from the other 
community currently live Current Users Low Very High 
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On governance we also registered possible convergence around the 
establishment of a rotating (according to set time periods) presidency/vice 
presidency elected through separate tickets with an element of cross-
voting. The presidential team would nominate a council of ministers 
responsible for those ministries under federal or mixed competences. The 
question of representation ratios within federal offices would remain and 
require compromise possibly by opting for a mix of 75-25, 60-40 and 50-50 
depending on the specific staffing requirement and other sensitivities of 
each ministry or federal office, thus de-politicising and de-polarising the 
issue of ratios, while in the case of the presidency this mix could be 
achieved by having a 2:1 ratio in terms of the communal origin of 
participants but a 50-50 ratio in terms of the right of each of the two leaders 
to nominate members in the council of ministers from both communities. A 
complementary way of resolving the issue of ratios involves establishing a 
trade-off between competences and ratios: the stronger the federal 
government would be in relation to the constituent states, the more 
equality in representation would be envisioned; and vice-versa (see Figures 
42 and 43).  
Compromise is possible on the question of rights and freedoms, with 
Turkish Cypriots willing to extend a general set of rights and freedoms to 
all citizens throughout the island with the qualified extension of voting, 
property and business establishment rights. This finding reflects how 
Turkish Cypriot attachment to bizonality is anchored above all in the fear 
of being dominated both politically and economically by the Greek 
Cypriots, while at the same time they maintain openness towards the 
principle of coexistence of the two communities and the creation of a 
multicultural society. 
Major divergences lie in the territory and ‘settlers’ dossiers which 
may call for a ‘give and take’ between these two dossiers. Territorial 
readjustments will inevitably be a major area of Turkish Cypriot 
concession, but the blow may be softened by including some federal areas 
(particularly in what is now Greek Cypriot territory) in the new map of 
Cyprus. As far as immigrants from Turkey are concerned, differences may 
well have to be split down the middle, while at the same time Greek 
Cypriot anxieties over immigration and the potential for racism and 
xenophobia would need to be tackled urgently through a ‘multi-cultural 
education drive’ (see Figure 44). 
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Figure 42. Proposed provisions in the dossier of Governance and Power-sharing, compatible with the requirements and 
sensitivities of the wider Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Population 
DOSSIER THEME PROPOSAL 
ACCEPTABILITY 
IN GREEK 
CYPRIOT 
COMMUNITY 
ACCEPTABILITY 
IN TURKISH 
CYPRIOT 
COMMUNITY 
Governance 
and Power 
Sharing 
Presidency The Presidency to be elected directly by the People Very High High 
Governance 
and Power 
Sharing 
Presidency 
The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot candidates to 
run on separate ballots, and then the winners of each 
ballot to come together and form the Presidency 
Moderate Very High 
Governance 
and Power 
Sharing 
Presidency 
A cross-voting element to be included, so that each 
community has a 15% - 20% say in the ballot of the other 
community 
Moderate Moderate to High 
Governance 
and Power 
Sharing 
Presidency 
The Presidency to be comprised of a President / Vice 
President Team which will then appoint the remaining 
Ministers of the Federal Government 
Moderate to High High 
Governance 
and Power 
Sharing 
Presidency Four Greek Cypriots and Two Turkish Cypriots to be appointed as Ministers of the Federal Government High Low 
Governance 
and Power 
Sharing 
Presidency 
Half of the ministers (i.e. two Greek Cypriots and one 
Turkish Cypriot) to be nominated by the winner of the 
Greek Cypriot ballot, while the other half (two Greek 
Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot) to be nominated by 
the winner of the Turkish Cypriot ballot, subject to 
ratification of all nominees by the Federal Senate 
Low High 
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Governance 
and Power 
Sharing 
Presidency 
Executive Decisions to be made collectively by the 
Federal Council of Ministers, with at least minority 
positive participation by the representatives of each 
community, and at least 50% participation for specific 
pre-agreed categories of decisions 
Moderate High 
Governance 
and Power 
Sharing 
Competences 
Federal Competences to include Foreign and EU Affairs, 
Security and Defence, Financial Affairs, Trade, Industry 
and Tourism Policy, Environment, Energy and Natural 
Resources, and finally Citizenship and Immigration 
High Moderate to High 
Governance 
and Power 
Sharing 
Competences 
Constituent State Competences to include Labour Policy 
and Social Security, Transport and Infrastructure, 
Supervision of the Police, Supervision of Cultural 
Heritage and Education 
Moderate to High High 
Governance 
and Power 
Sharing 
Competences 
Supervision of Cultural Heritage and Education to also 
be treated as 'communal competences', especially for 
Greek Cypriot residents / heritage sites in the north and 
Turkish Cypriot residents / heritage sites in the south, 
through co-operation agreements between the 
Constituent States which will clarify issues of 
administrative and supervisory responsibility 
High High 
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Figure 43. Schematic representation of proposed model for the election of the federal presidency, compatible with the 
requirements and sensitivities of the wider Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot population 
GREEK CYPRIOT ELECTORATE TURKISH CYPRIOT ELECTORATE 
BALLOT OF 
 GREEK CYPRIOT 
PRESIDENTIAL  
CANDIDATES 
BALLOT OF  
TURKISH CYPRIOT 
PRESIDENTIAL  
CANDIDATES 
WINNER - 
GREEK CYPRIOT 
NOMINEE 
WINNER - 
TURKISH CYPRIOT 
NOMINEE 
PRESIDENT / VICE PRESIDENT TEAM 
TWO GREEK CYPRIOT AND ONE TURK-
ISH CYPRIOT MINISTERIAL CANDI-
DATES NOMINATED BY THE TURKISH 
CYPRIOT MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT / 
VICE PRESIDENT TEAM, SUBJECT TO 
RATIFICA TION BY THE SENATE 
TWO GREEK CYPRIOT AND ONE TURK-
ISH CYPRIOT MINISTERIAL CANDI-
DATES NOMINATED BY THE GREEK 
CYPRIOT MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT / 
VICE PRESIDENT TEAM, SUBJECT TO 
RATIFICA TION BY THE SENATE 
FEDERAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
(DECIDING AS A COLLECTIVE BODY) 
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Figure 44. Proposed ‘give and take’ between the dossiers of Territory and Citizenship 
DOSSIER THEME PROPOSED RESOLUTION 
ACCEPTABILITY 
IN GREEK 
CYPRIOT 
COMMUNITY 
ACCEPTABILITY 
IN TURKISH 
CYPRIOT 
COMMUNITY 
Territory Territorial Status of Varosha To be returned under Greek Cypriot Administration Very High Moderate to Low 
Territory Territorial Status of Morphou To be returned under Greek Cypriot Administration Very High Very Low 
Territory Territorial Status of Karpasia Peninsula and Akamas Peninsula 
To be converted into 'Federal 
Nature Preserves' under the 
direct administration of the 
Federal Government 
Moderate Moderate 
Citizenship 
Citizenship status of individuals who came 
to the north from Turkey but have married 
a Turkish Cypriot, and children of such 
mixed marriages 
To be granted citizenship Moderate Very High 
Citizenship 
Citizenship status of children whose 
parents came to the north from Turkey but 
who were themselves born in Cyprus 
To be granted citizenship Moderate to Low Very High 
Citizenship 
Citizenship status of individuals who came 
to the north from Turkey, and have been in 
Cyprus for more than 10 years 
To be granted citizenship or 
permanent residency Very Low Very High 
Citizenship 
Citizenship status of individuals who came 
to the north from Turkey and have been in 
Cyprus for less than 10 years 
To be assisted for a gradual 
return to Turkey, or granted 
residency on a case-by-case basis 
Moderate to Low Moderate to Low 
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What this project, with its two surveys and books, has attempted to 
demonstrate is that a people’s peace in Cyprus is possible. Particularly 
when delving into the details of a future plan, including on the most vexed 
questions of the Cyprus settlement, we have found not only that 
compromise is feasible, but above all, by probing into what citizens think, 
fear and desire, new and creative ideas may be put to the service of the 
peace process on the island. 
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Annex 1. Research Methodology 
The survey questionnaire (see Annex 2) was designed by CEPS in 
collaboration with its Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot project partners. 
The questionnaire was subsequently translated into Greek and Turkish, 
and the field work was administered by CYMAR Market Research30 in the 
Greek Cypriot Community and Prologue Consulting31 in the Turkish 
Cypriot Community. The field work was conducted within a period of four 
weeks, from early January to early February 2009.  
For the Greek Cypriot Community: 
Methodology Report by CYMAR Market Research 
1. Coverage 
The survey was national and covered urban and rural areas in the 
government-controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus (south of the 
island). Greek-Cypriot males and females 18 years and over were eligible to 
participate in the study. 
2. Conduct method 
Interviews using a questionnaire (see Annex 2) were carried out face to face 
at the residence of respondents. 
3. Sample selection 
The sample was selected using a combination of random multistage area 
probability sampling and quotas sampling: the sample was selected in 
various stages as follows: 
Stage one: Stratification of the areas 
                                                     
30 CYMAR Market Research Ltd, established in 1994, is a Cyprus-based company 
specialising in market research. It operates primarily within the Greek Cypriot 
community. Cymar is a member of ESOMAR (European Society for Opinion and 
Market Research) and SEDEAK (Cyprus Association of Opinion Poll and Market 
Research Enterprises) (see http://www.cymar.com.cy)  
31 Established in 2002, Prologue Consulting Ltd is a market research and consulting 
company based in the northern part of Cyprus. Prologue is a member of ESOMAR 
(European Society for Opinion and Market Research) (see 
http://www.prologueconsulting.com). 
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Areas of the island covered by the study were stratified into urban 
and rural on the basis of the latest 2001 Population Census, carried out by the 
Department of Statistical Services of the Republic of Cyprus.  
Stage two: Selection of PSUS (Primary Sampling Units) 
For the purposes of sample selection, urban areas in each district 
were divided into a number of enumeration areas of approximately the 
same size (~1000 persons each). 
The greater urban area of Nicosia was divided into 209 enumeration 
areas, of Limassol into 161, Larnaca into 72 and Paphos into 45. 
For the sample selection, the enumeration areas in urban districts and 
the villages in rural areas were treated as primary sampling units.  
In each district, urban enumeration areas had an equal probability of 
being chosen as primary sampling units. By contrast, rural enumeration 
areas (villages) had a probability of being selected that was proportionate 
to their size. 
In total, 68 enumeration areas in urban areas and 32 villages in rural 
areas were randomly selected.  
Each area selected was allocated an equal number of interviews.  
The distribution of the primary sampling units selected among the 
five districts and among urban and rural areas within each district was 
representative of the actual population in the south. 
Stage three:  Selection of households 
Within each Primary Sampling Unit selected at stage two an equal 
number of households was selected in such a way that each household was 
given, as far as possible, an equal probability of selection.  
In the selected area the interviewer was allocated a random starting 
point,32 from which he/she commenced calling on every nth household 
encountered.  
Stage four:  Selection of individuals 
In each household selected at stage three, one person was selected 
based on predefined quotas. Quotas were set with respect to sex and age in 
                                                     
32 Both enumeration areas and starting points were randomly selected with the aid of 
purpose-built computer software. 
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order to ensure that the selected sample was representative of the target 
population of the survey.  
4. Sample size 
In total 1000 interviews were carried out. 
5. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire of the survey was submitted by CEPS.  
6. Training and control of the interviewers 
All interviewers who participated in the study have previous experience 
with social research, and have all completed their education, at least to 
secondary level.  
Regardless of the experience of the interviewers, all interviewers 
went through a 3-day training stage before fieldwork commenced.  
During the training, the questionnaires and the conduct method were 
fully explained and interviewers participated in pilot studies. Written 
instructions were given to interviewers explaining the method of sample 
selection, how to approach people and the point of the questionnaire.  
In total, 30 interviewers and 4 supervisors worked on the study.  
The interviewers delivered their work to the supervisors on a daily 
basis and the supervisors were responsible for the daily checking of the 
completed questionnaires. There was a 15% recall of the work of each 
interviewer to make sure of the authenticity of the responses, the time the 
interview took and the behaviour of the interviewers. The whole study was 
supervised by the manager in charge of the project.  
For the Turkish Cypriot Community: 
Methodology Report by Prologue Consulting 
1. Coverage 
The survey in the Turkish Cypriot Community was national and covered 
urban and rural areas. Turkish-Cypriot males and females of 18 years and 
over were eligible to participate in the study. 
2. Conduct method 
Interviews were carried out face to face at the residence of respondents. 
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3. Sample selection 
The sample was selected using a combination of random multistage area 
probability sampling and quotas sampling: The sample was selected in 
various stages as follows: 
Stage one: Stratification of the areas 
Areas of the island covered by the study were stratified into urban 
and rural on the basis of the latest Census, carried out by the Department of 
Statistical Services and the 5 districts were allocated quotas according to the 
natural distribution of the population.    
Stage two:  Selection of individuals 
The individuals to be surveyed were selected using a specifically 
designed computer programme using preselected quotas.  Quotas were set 
with respect to sex and age in order to ensure that the selected sample was 
representative of the target population of the survey.  
4. Sample size 
In total 1000 interviews were carried out. 
5. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire of the survey was submitted by CEPS.  
6. Training and control of the interviewers 
All interviewers who participated in the study had previous experience 
with social research, and have all completed their education, at least to 
secondary level.  
Regardless of the experience of the interviewers, all interviewers 
went through a 3-day training stage before fieldwork commenced.  
During the training, the questionnaires and the conduct method were 
fully explained and interviewers participated in pilot studies. Written 
instructions were given to interviewers explaining the method of sample 
selection, how to approach people and the purpose of the questionnaire.  
For the purposes of this study, 40 interviewers were used.  
There was a recall of 25% of the work selected at random in order to 
make certain of the authenticity of the responses, the time the interview 
took and the behaviour of the interviewers. The whole study was 
supervised by the manager in charge of the project.  
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Annex 2. Survey Questionnaire 
Pre-translation template questionnaire 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study regarding the Cyprus Problem, 
which is being supervised by the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. 
Your responses will only be used for statistical analysis and remain anonymous. 
The duration of this interview will be about 45 minutes.  
Section A – Underlying Attitudes 
A1. Since 21st March 2008, the leaders of the two communities Demetris 
Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, have begun to engage in a process of 
negotiations for a Comprehensive Settlement, initially through Technical 
Committees and Working Groups and more recently through direct 
discussions between the two leaders. 
a. To what extent are you hopeful that this process will produce results? 
(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - “no hope at all” to 10 - “great hope”, NR = 99)  
b. To what extent do you wish - and expect from the leaders - that they 
reach a mutually acceptable settlement through this process? (0 to 10 
scale, from 0 - “I strongly prefer that nothing comes of this process” to 10 - 
“I strongly wish that this process leads to a Settlement”, NR = 99) 
 
A2. Of the following possible motives for solving the Cyprus Problem, 
which five are most important to you? (Choose up to five options) 
1. Being able to live and work anywhere in Cyprus 
2. Improving our economic situation 
3. Ending the threat that emanates from Turkey / the Greek Cypriots 
4. Putting the past behind us so we can look towards the future 
5. Preserving our cultural identity and the cultural identity of our land 
6. Achieving justice in relation to properties lost during the events from 
1963 to 1974 
7. Achieving the territorial unity of Cyprus 
8. Returning to a constitutional order where the two communities share 
power and govern Cyprus together. 
9. Fully enjoying the benefits of EU membership 
10. Living within a functional, democratic and internationally respected 
state 
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A3. Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, and 
considering each of the alternative settlement models presented below, 
how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of these 
models? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - 
“Absolutely Essential”, NR = 99) 
1. A Bizonal Bicommunal Federation 
2. A Confederation of two sovereign States 
3. One Unitary State and Central Government for the whole of Cyprus 
4. Two separate and internationally recognised States 
5. Continuation of the current situation 
 
A4. And how acceptable or unacceptable do you think each of these models 
is for the majority of the other community (1-Majority of the other community 
would definitely reject this, 2-Majority of the other community would tolerate this 
as a compromise option, 3-Majority of the other community would find this 
satisfactory, NR = 9) 
1. A Bizonal Bicommunal Federation 
2. A Confederation of two sovereign States 
3. One Unitary State and Central Government for the whole of Cyprus 
4. Two separate and internationally recognised States 
5. Continuation of the current situation 
Section B – Security and Guarantees of Implementation  
B1. One important issue in these current negotiations, regarding the 
security and guarantees dossier, is the manner in which unified Cyprus, 
Greece and Turkey will co-operate to ensure that the implementation of a 
settlement will happen smoothly as agreed in advance. In this matter, how 
acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following overall 
frameworks? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - 
“Absolutely Essential”, NR = 99) 
1. The Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 - between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom - will continue to apply without any 
changes, as part of the Comprehensive Settlement agreement. 
2. The Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 - between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom - will continue to apply but certain 
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amendments will be made to it in response to specific concerns 
expressed by one or the other community. 
3. A new Treaty will be signed between unified Cyprus, Turkey and 
Greece, that will clarify each side’s responsibility regarding the 
implementation of the agreement, in a spirit of equality between the 
signatory states. 
4. There will be no Treaty specifically governing the relations between 
unified Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. Instead, the three States will be 
expected to act in compliance with International Law as set out in the 
UN Charter and other relevant international agreements. 
 
B2. Now, regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement 
between the above mentioned sides regarding the implementation of a 
comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you 
consider the inclusion of each of the following elements? (0 to 10 scale for 
each, from 0 - “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - “Absolutely Essential”, NR = 99) 
1. It should be made clear that the ‘right of intervention’ by Greece or 
Turkey excludes the possibility of military intervention. 
2. It should be re-affirmed that the ‘right of intervention’ of Greece or 
Turkey can still be exercised unilaterally by one or the other, in case 
agreement between them proves impossible. 
3. It should be made clear that before any military intervention can take 
place by Greece or Turkey, permission will need to be granted by the 
UN Security Council. 
4. ‘Rights of intervention’ by Greece or Turkey should be abolished 
altogether on the basis that unified Cyprus is going to be a sovereign 
country that is capable of taking care of its own affairs. 
5. A set of guidelines should be agreed in advance by all the sides, 
clarifying the appropriate response and responsibility for each 
implementation-related challenge that may in the future arise. 
6. A consensual mechanism should be devised so that Turkey, Greece 
and unified Cyprus can resolve all implementation-related challenges 
that may arise; and in case consensus proves impossible then the UN 
will decide on what course of action must be taken. 
7. The EU should set – for all the sides - motives for implementation 
and penalties for non-implementation, related to EU benefits and 
participation in EU decision making. 
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8. Whatever treaty is agreed should be ratified by a UN Security 
Council Resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which would 
mean that in case of non-implementation the UN would have the 
right to forcefully intervene to restore the state of affairs agreed to in 
the settlement. 
 
B3. On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a 
Comprehensive Settlement, how much would you be willing or unwilling 
to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 
- “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - “Absolutely Essential”, NR = 99) 
1. A unified bicommunal security force, comprised of Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots, under the control of the Federal Government 
and charged with various matters related to the security of Cyprus 
2. British troops that will be camped in the Sovereign Base Areas as they 
are today 
3. A UN Force that will be the successor of today’s UNFICYP and which 
will be overseeing matters related to the implementation of the 
solution 
4. An International Force with a full Chapter 7 Security Council 
mandate, with the authorization to intervene using force if necessary 
to ensure the implementation of the solution 
5. 950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers as per the 1960 Treaty of 
Alliance to remain in Cyprus indefinitely or until both communities 
agree that their presence is no longer required 
6. 950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers as per the 1960 Treaty of 
Alliance to be phased out as and when Turkey joins the EU 
7. Several thousand (from 3,000 to 6,000) Greek soldiers and an equal 
number of Turkish soldiers 
8. A Turkish military base somewhere in the northern part of Cyprus, 
which will be given to Turkey in return for the cancellation of the 
1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. 
9. A NATO force that will be in charge of the overall Security of Cyprus, 
and assuming that Cyprus will in the meantime also have become a 
full member of NATO 
10. A European Security Force comprised of soldiers from various 
European countries, including Turkey and Greece, and charged with 
various matters related to the security of Cyprus 
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11. A common Cypriot-Greek-Turkish security force that will be serving 
together in missions outside Cyprus within the context of the 
European Security and Defence Policy 
12. A unified bicommunal security force, comprised of Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots, that will be serving in UN Peacekeeping 
Missions abroad. 
 
B4. The possibility of challenges and difficulties after a solution is agreed is 
often discussed and considered within each community. Regarding this 
matter, which of the following post-solution scenarios do you consider 
most likely to materialize in the future? (Choose up to five options) 
1. Problems and deadlocks occur in the decision making of the Federal 
Government leading to inadequate governance 
2. The Greek Cypriots evict or render politically ineffective the Turkish 
Cypriots at Federal Government level and take over for themselves 
all the decision making authority 
3. The Turkish Cypriots with Turkey refuse to return properties and 
territories which it was agreed to return to their original owners in 
the context of the settlement 
4. Turkey does not withdraw her troops from Cyprus in accordance 
with the agreed timetable 
5. Turkey abuses her guarantor status, to interfere in the internal affairs 
of Cyprus 
6. Greece abuses her guarantor status, to interfere in the internal affairs 
of Cyprus 
7. The people from Turkey (‘Settlers’) that it was agreed should leave 
after a Settlement, do not depart as planned  
8. Greek Cypriots with Greece attack and attempt to take over the 
Turkish Cypriot constituent state so that they will control all of 
Cyprus 
9. Turkish Cypriots with Turkey attack and attempt to take over the 
Greek Cypriot constituent state so that they will control all of Cyprus 
10. Turkish Cypriots with Turkey use whatever elements of separation 
are in the agreement in order to secede from the Federation and 
achieve a separate independent state in the north. 
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B5. And for each of the above threat scenarios, what type of external 
intervention aimed at restoring order would you be willing to consider? 
(Response Options for each question are: 1-Military Intervention by Turkey or 
Greece to defend the side that is under attack, 2- Political and Economic Sanctions 
by the European Union against the guilty party, 3-Peacekeeping Intervention by 
the United Nations. Multiple Responses are permitted. NR = 9) 
1. Problems and deadlocks occur in the decision-making of the Federal 
Government leading to inadequate governance 
2. The Greek Cypriots evict or render politically ineffective the Turkish 
Cypriots at Federal Government level and take over for themselves 
all the decision-making authority 
3. The Turkish Cypriots with Turkey refuse to return properties and 
territories which it was agreed to return to their original owners in 
the context of the settlement 
4. Turkey does not withdraw her troops from Cyprus in accordance 
with the agreed timetable 
5. Turkey abuses her guarantor status, to interfere in the internal affairs 
of Cyprus 
6. Greece abuses her guarantor status, to interfere in the internal affairs 
of Cyprus 
7. The people from Turkey (‘Settlers’) that it was agreed should leave 
after a Settlement, do not depart as planned  
8. Greek Cypriots with Greece attack and attempt to take over the 
Turkish Cypriot constituent state so that they will control all of 
Cyprus 
9. Turkish Cypriots with Turkey attack and attempt to take over the 
Greek Cypriot constituent state so that they will control all of Cyprus 
10. Turkish Cypriots with Turkey use whatever elements of separation 
are in the agreement in order to secede from the Federation and 
achieve a separate independent state in the north. 
 
C. Governance and Power Sharing 
C1. One important issue in the current negotiations is the matter of the 
Presidency of the new Federal Government. In relation to this matter, do 
you prefer - 
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a. Having a Presidential Council, where President, Vice President and 
ministers will all be elected to their position and decide issues 
together as a Council,  
Or,  
b. Do you instead tend to favour having a strong President / Vice 
President Team, to include a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot, 
who will then appoint the remaining ministers?  
(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - ‘Strongly prefer a Presidential Council’ to 10 - 
‘Strongly prefer a President / Vice President Team’, NR = 99) 
 
C2. Whichever of these two forms the Presidency takes, do you prefer that -  
a. The Presidency is elected by the Federal Senate,  
Or,  
b. The Presidency is elected directly by the people?  
(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - ‘Strongly prefer election of Presidency by the Federal 
Senate’ to 10 - ‘Strongly prefer election of Presidency by the People’, NR = 99) 
 
C3. And regarding the composition of the Presidency, how acceptable or 
unacceptable do you consider each of the following ratios of representation 
between the two communities? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - “Entirely 
Unacceptable” to 10 - “Absolutely Essential”, NR = 99) 
1. Four Greek Cypriots to Two Turkish Cypriots. 
2. Four Greek Cypriots to Three Turkish Cypriots. 
3. Four Greek Cypriots to Four Turkish Cypriots. 
 
C4. Regarding the manner in which the representatives of the two 
communities to the Presidency will be elected, would you say that you 
prefer that - 
a. The Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots run together for election as 
one team,  
Or,  
b. That they run for election separately in each community and then the 
winners of each community come together to form the Presidency?  
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(0 to 10 scale, from ‘0 - Strongly prefer that they Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots run together as a team’ to ‘10 - Strongly prefer that the Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots run separately’, NR = 99) 
 
C5. And if they do run together as one team, how much of a say do you 
believe each community should have in the election of such a presidential 
team? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - “Absolutely 
Essential”, NR = 99) 
1. The voting power to be in accordance with the population, i.e. about 
75 – 80% for Greek Cypriots and 20 – 25% for Turkish Cypriots. 
2. The voting power to be at a ratio of 60% for Greek Cypriots and 40% 
for Turkish Cypriots. 
3. The voting power of the two communities to be equal, i.e. 50% for 
Greek Cypriots and 50% for Turkish Cypriots. 
 
C6. More broadly, regarding the manner of election of federal officials, and 
as a matter of principle, would you say that you prefer – 
a. Mono-communal voting where each community elects its own 
representatives, thus motivating politicians to focus on satisfying all 
segments of their own community but not worrying so much about 
satisfying members of the other community, 
Or, 
b. Cross voting, where each community primarily elects its own 
representatives but also has some say about who will be elected from 
the other community, thus motivating politicians to focus on 
satisfying major segments both of their own and of the other 
community, but not worrying so much about satisfying the more 
hard-line members of their own or of the other community. 
(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - ‘Strongly prefer mono-communal voting’ to 10 - 
‘Strongly prefer cross voting’, NR = 99) 
 
C7. Another important matter related to the federal presidency is the 
manner in which decisions will be made. In this regard, how acceptable or 
unacceptable do you consider each of the following options? (0 to 10 scale 
for each, from 0 - “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - “Absolutely Essential”, NR = 
99) 
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1. All executive decisions will be made by simple majority in the 
council. 
2. All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but 
within that supporting majority there must be at least minority 
support from the representatives of each community 
3. All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but 
within that supporting majority there must be at least 50% support 
from the representatives of each community 
4. All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but 
the President and Vice-President will each possess the right to veto 
any decision on behalf of their community. 
 
C8. Finally in the dossier of Governance and Power Sharing, the issue of 
the distribution of competences has also been discussed a lot recently in the 
negotiations. The important matter that needs to be decided is which of the 
following competences will be administered by each community 
separately, and which will be administered by the two communities 
working together. (0 to 10 response scale for each, from ‘0 – strongly prefer that 
my community separately manages its affairs on this issue’, to ‘10 – Strongly 
prefer that the two communities work together on this issue’, NR = 99) 
1. Foreign and EU Policy 
2. Security and Defence 
3. Supervision of the Banking Sector 
4. Trade, Industry and Tourism Policy 
5. Labour Policy and Social Security 
6. Education Policy 
7. Health Policy 
8. Supervision of Cultural heritage 
9. Environment, Energy and Natural Resources  
10. Transport and Infrastructure  
11. Citizenship, Human Rights and Immigration and Asylum 
12. Supervision of the police 
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C9. More broadly on the issue of competences, and as a matter of principle, 
would you say that you prefer – 
a. A strong federal government, so that the emphasis is on inter-
communal co-operation at the level of day-to-day decision making 
but running an increased risk of disagreements and difficulties in 
reaching decisions 
Or, 
b. Strong constituent states, so that the emphasis is on separately 
managing day-to-day affairs and avoiding deadlocks in decision 
making, but running an increased risk of the two communities 
gradually moving away from each other. 
(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - ‘Prefer a strong federal government’ to 10 - ‘Prefer 
strong constituent states’, NR = 99) 
D. Property Rights and Territorial Issues  
D1. Regarding the Property Issue, the most important decision to be made 
in the negotiations is whether particular properties will be returned – or 
restituted – to their pre 1963 / 1974 owners or whether instead their 
ownership will pass to the current user and the original owner will be 
compensated for the loss of his property. For each of the following 
categories of property, which types of resolution would you be willing to 
consider? (Response options for each question are: 1-Such properties must 
definitely be returned to original owners, 2-It would be preferable if such properties 
were returned to original owners, 3-I am open to both alternative solutions for such 
properties, 4-It would be preferable if such properties remain with current users, 5-
Such properties must definitely remain with current users, NR = 9) 
1. Currently unused properties 
2. Properties where displaced persons from the other community 
currently live 
3. Properties where immigrants from Turkey currently live 
4. Properties which are currently used by nationals of other countries 
(e.g. from Britain, Germany, Israel etc), as residences or holiday 
homes 
5. Properties that are currently used as factories, shops, or offices 
6. Partly used properties, that are not currently vital either as residences 
or for income generation 
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7. Properties that used to be empty plots before 1963/1974 but now 
have homes or apartments built on them 
8. Originally privately owned properties on which public utilities – 
airports, hospitals, universities etc. have in the meantime been 
constructed (e.g. Larnaca Airport in the south, Eastern Mediterranean 
University in the north). 
9. Properties on which significant improvements have been made, to the 
extent that their value has been increased by more than 50% 
10. Properties that host churches, mosques, cemeteries, and other such 
religious monuments (e.g. Orthodox churches in the north, mosques 
in the south) 
 
D2. Regarding those properties which for whichever reason might not be 
returned to their original owners, how acceptable or unacceptable would 
you consider each of the following alternative forms of compensation? (0 to 
10 scale for each, from 0 - “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - “Absolutely Essential”, 
NR = 99) 
1. Original owners to be compensated with properties of equivalent 
value that are now in areas under the control of their own community 
2. Original owners to be compensated with properties of equivalent 
value in the same town or village as their original property 
3. Original owners to be invited to choose from a range of properties of 
equivalent value, anywhere in Cyprus 
4. Original owners to be compensated with guaranteed bonds, which 
they will be able to redeem for cash at their expiration or alternatively 
sell the bonds in the free market whenever they wish 
5. Original owners to be compensated in cash and without delay 
 
D3. Regarding the Territorial aspect, how acceptable or unacceptable 
would you consider each of the following schemes for territorial 
adjustment? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - 
“Absolutely Essential”, NR = 99) 
1. Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot 
administration. 
2. Varosha only to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration. 
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3. Varosha, Morphou and Karpasia Peninsula to be returned under 
Greek Cypriot administration. 
4. Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot 
administration, Karpasia Peninsula and Akamas Peninsula to both be 
converted into ‘Federal Nature Preserves’ under the direct 
administration of the federal government. 
5. Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot 
administration, Nicosia to be converted into a Federal Area under the 
direct administration of the federal government. 
6. Varosha, Morphou and Nicosia to be converted into Federal Areas 
under the direct administration of the federal government. 
Notes to interviewer regarding question D3:  
i. In case the respondent is unfamiliar with any of the areas described, or is 
confused about what the proposal geographically entails, use the attached 
map to pinpoint the areas being described. 
ii. In case the respondent inquires about the meaning of ‘Federal Areas’, 
explain that “These will be areas where the Federal Government, comprised 
of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, will be exercising direct 
supervision, and where both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will be 
living.” 
iii. In case the respondent inquires about the meaning of ‘Federal Nature 
Preserves’, explain that “These will be areas where the Federal Government, 
comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, will be exercising direct 
supervision and enforcing special regulations regarding nature 
conservation, and where both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will be 
living.” 
E. Citizenship and Residence Rights 
E1. Regarding the persons who have come to the north from Turkey since 
the events of 1974 – and also others who have come from non-EU third 
countries (e.g. from Russia, Lebanon, Pakistan etc.) and now live among 
Greek Cypriots – one important decision that will have to be made in the 
negotiations will be whether these persons can stay on in Cyprus after a 
settlement or not. 
Specifically, the available options for such groups of people include, 
being allowed to stay with full citizenship rights, being allowed to stay 
with a residence permit and work permit but without being citizens, being 
asked to leave immediately, or being asked to leave after a transition period 
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of a few years. Which of these options would you find acceptable for each 
of the following groups? You may select as many options as you wish for 
each group. (Response options for each question are: 1-Citizenship, 2-Residence 
Permit, 3-Immediate Departure, 4-Gradual Departure. Multiple responses to each 
question are permitted. NR = 9) 
1. Individuals who came to the north from Turkey but have married a 
Turkish Cypriot 
2. Individuals who came to the north from Turkey, and have been in 
Cyprus for more than 10 years 
3. Individuals who came to the north from Turkey and have been in 
Cyprus for less than 10 years 
4. Children whose parents came to the north from Turkey but who were 
themselves born in Cyprus 
5. Children who were born in Cyprus, but with one parent Turkish 
Cypriot and one parent who came from Turkey 
6. Individuals who came to the south from a third country, but have 
married a Greek Cypriot 
7. Individuals who came to the south from a third country, and have 
been in Cyprus for more than 10 years 
8. Individuals who came to the south from a third country and have 
been in Cyprus for less than 10 years 
9. Children whose parents came to the south from a third country but 
were themselves born in Cyprus 
10. Children who were born in Cyprus, but with one parent Greek 
Cypriot and one parent who came from a third country 
 
E2. Moving on to the issue of individual rights, for any Greek Cypriots who 
will choose to live in the north and any Turkish Cypriots who will choose 
to live in the south after a Settlement, one issue that has often been 
discussed is how such rights will be regulated. In this context, how 
acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following options? 
(0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - “Absolutely 
Essential”, NR = 99) 
1. Such relocation would not be permitted: All Greek Cypriots would 
live in the south and all Turkish Cypriots would live in the north 
after a settlement 
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2. There would be a quota regulating resettlement village by village – so 
for instance in any specific village not more than one third of its 
residents can come from the other community 
3. There would be an overall quota regulating resettlement for the 
constituent state – so for instance not more than one third of the 
residents in a whole constituent state can come from the other 
community - but individual villages may exceed that number 
4. There would be a quota on how many from the other community can 
receive full voting rights in the constituent state, but the right to live 
and work anywhere in Cyprus would be exercised freely 
5. There would not be any quotas or regulations, and individuals of 
both communities will be free to live, work and exercise voting rights 
wherever they wish on the island 
6. There would be quotas and regulations in some regions of the island 
while in other regions there will be no quotas or regulations, 
depending on the social and other conditions that prevail locally. 
 
E3. Looking more specifically at the types of rights that Turkish Cypriots 
would have in the south and Greek Cypriots would have in the north, how 
do you see the granting of each of the following rights? (0 to 10 scale for each, 
from 0 – ‘the granting of this right would make me very uncomfortable’, to 10 – ‘I 
consider the granting of this right absolutely essential’, NR = 99)  
1. The right to move around freely and visit any part of Cyprus 
2. The right to get a job 
3. The right to receive public benefits 
4. The right to start a business or buy an existing business 
5. The right to purchase property  
6. The right to receive education in one’s own mother tongue 
7. The right to religious worship in accordance with one’s own creed  
8. The right to vote in local municipal elections 
9. The right to vote in Constituent State elections 
10. The right to vote in Federal elections for the representatives of the 
Constituent State they live in. 
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F. A Future Referendum 
F1. Coming to the end of this survey, we would like to ask you to consider 
a hypothetical scenario where the negotiations between the two leaders 
conclude, a solution plan is drafted and a referendum is organised. In such 
a future referendum, how do you see yourself voting? (NR = 9) 
1. I would certainly, or almost certainly, vote ‘No’ 
2. I currently lean towards a ‘No’ vote, though I might at that time sway 
towards a ‘Yes’ vote 
3. I am currently just as likely to vote ‘Yes’ as to vote ‘No’  
4. I currently lean towards a ‘Yes’ vote, though I might at that time 
sway towards a ‘No’ vote 
5. I would certainly, or almost certainly, vote ‘Yes’ 
 
If response to F1 is 2, 3, 4 or 9, then ask F2 as follows: 
 
F2. And of the following possible factors, which do you think will most 
influence your decision to vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ at such a future referendum? 
(Choose up to five options) 
1. The security and guarantees provisions of the plan 
2. The property provisions of the plan 
3. The territorial adjustment provisions of the plan 
4. The governance and power sharing provisions of the plan 
5. The economic provisions of the plan 
6. The citizenship (i.e. regarding the settlers) provisions of the plan 
7. The way the issue of bizonality and basic freedoms is approached in 
the plan 
8. The way the issue of legal status and sovereignty is approached in the 
plan 
9. Whether the other community has convinced me of their sincere 
intentions and their ability to work together with us 
10. Whether Turkey / Greece has convinced me that it really intends to 
honor the agreement 
11. The position that my close social or family circle will adopt vis-à-vis 
the Plan 
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12. The position that my political party will adopt vis-à-vis the Plan 
13. The position that the President will adopt vis-à-vis the Plan 
14. The position that the Greek / Turkish Government will adopt vis-à-
vis the Plan (note to translators: We mean here the position of the respective 
‘motherland’: Greece for GCs, Turkey for TCs.) 
G. Demographics  
G1. Year of Birth 
G2. Age Group 
G3. Gender 
G4. Place of Residence 
G5. District 
G6. Urban / Rural 
G7. Level of Education 
G8. Family Income 
G9. Refugee Status 
G10. Settler Status  
G11. Profession 
G12. Newspaper Readership 
G13. Vote in 2004 referendum 
G14. Vote in most recent parliamentary elections 
G15. Projected vote ‘if there were parliamentary elections tomorrow’ 
G16. Projected vote if there were presidential elections tomorrow, between 
Talat / Eroglu (TCs only), or projected vote in 2009 EU Parliament elections 
(GCs only) 
G17. Interviewee Attention Span / Quality of Interview 
118 | 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
Alexandros Lordos is Director of the Cyprus Institute for Policy 
Analysis, an independent research organisation, which utilises 
mathematical and statistical tools in the context of policy research. In the 
years since the 2004 referendum, he carried out a number of inter-
communal polls in Cyprus including: “Options for Peace: Mapping the 
Possibilities for a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus” (May 2005) and 
“Building Trust: An Inter-communal Analysis of Public Opinion in 
Cyprus” (April 2006). Lordos has also served as consultant to the UN Force 
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in the first-ever inter-communal survey of public 
opinion that the UN conducted in Cyprus, during the spring of 2007. The 
results of the UN survey are available online at www.unficyp.org 
 
Erol Kaymak is Chairman of the Department of International 
Relations at the Eastern Mediterranean University based in Famagusta. He 
has published on the topics of ethnic politics and Cyprus in journals 
including Mediterranean Politics, the European Journal of Political Research, the 
Cyprus Review, and Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. He has also contributed 
to several edited volumes. He is co-author of the CIVICUS Civil Society 
Index report of 2005 for Cyprus. Kaymak served as expert consultant for 
the UN (UNFICYP) in polling in Cyprus in 2007. 
 
Nathalie Tocci is a Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali 
and an Associate Fellow at CEPS specialising in European foreign policy, 
the European neighbourhood and conflict resolution. Her publications 
include The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard 
(Routledge 2007) and EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: 
Promoting Peace or Catalyzing Partition in Cyprus (Ashgate, 2004). Tocci is the 
2008 winner of the Anna Lindh award for the study of European foreign 
policy. 
